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SYMPOSIUM: CLASS IN AMERICA
PAYROLL TAXES, MYTHOLOGY,
AND FAIRNESS
LINDA SUGIN*
As the 2012 fiscal cliff approached, Congress and President Obama bick-
ered over the top marginal income tax rate that would apply to a tiny sliver of
the population, while allowing payroll taxes to quietly rise for all working Amer-
icans. Though most Americans pay more payroll tax than income tax, academic
and public debates rarely mention it. The combined effect of the payroll tax and
the income tax produce dramatically heavier tax liabilities on labor compared to
capital, producing substantial horizontal and vertical inequity in the tax system.
This article argues that a fair tax system demands just overall burdens, and
that the current combination of income taxes and payroll taxes imposes too
heavy a relative burden on wage earners. It scrutinizes the payroll tax to debunk
myths that artificially link payroll taxes to retirement security, and argues that
these myths have lulled workers into accepting substantial and regressive tax
burdens. Freed from the analytical limitations of an insurance label and a pri-
vate-savings paradigm, policymakers can be better guided by fundamental prin-
ciples of fairness. By refuting justifications for taxing capital income more
lightly than labor income, and offering fairness arguments for taxing work less
than investment, the article makes a case for equalizing the tax burdens on labor
and capital income. Social Security’s outlays constitute one-fifth of total federal
spending, and this article maintains that it should be financed by a fair tax.
I. INTRODUCTION
People who work bear a disproportionate share of the federal tax bur-
den, while those lucky enough to live off their investments contribute a
much smaller share to the federal treasury. Mitt Romney’s assurance that he
paid at least 14% of his income in taxes,1 and Warren Buffett’s assertion that
his secretary paid a higher average rate of tax than he did,2 taught many
Americans that the super-rich can pay very low rates of tax. Romney and
Buffett are primarily taxed under the federal income tax, which has preferen-
tial rates for people who earn their money from investments. Most Ameri-
cans are not so lucky because they are primarily taxed under the payroll tax.3
The payroll tax does not apply to investment income, only to wage earnings,
* Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. B.A., Harvard University; J.D., New York Uni-
versity Law School. I am grateful to Mark McMillan for his excellent research assistance.
1 Annie Lowrey, Romney’s Taxes Compared With Everyone Else’s, N.Y. Times THE
CAUCUS BLOG (Sept. 21, 2012, 4:17 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/
romneys-taxes-compared-with-everyone-elses, archived at http://perma.cc/0LLBVjTxviN.
2 Seniboye Tienabeso, Warren Buffett and His Secretary Talk Taxes, ABC NEWS (Jan. 25,
2012 5:14 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/business/2012/01/warren-buffett-and-his-secre-
tary-talk-taxes/, archived at http://perma.cc/0pV85XJdsPp.
3 Historical Payroll Tax vs. Income Tax, TAX POL’Y CTR., http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=230, archived at http://perma.cc/0JGHbo1Ln5U.
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and it has no preferential rates or loopholes.4 It is a flat tax imposed on every
dollar of wages that most individuals earn.5 A single, childless worker earn-
ing $20,000 will pay $1,530 in payroll tax in 2013, and his employer will
pay the same on his behalf. Although Romney made 47% of Americans
famous for paying no federal income tax, a worker in the 47% nonetheless
pays a substantial share of earnings in federal tax.6 Of the 53% who do pay
income taxes, wage earners are taxed twice on their earnings, under both the
payroll and income taxes.
The Romney and Buffett examples illustrate why the lighter burden on
investment income should be understood as an issue of progressivity. The
super-rich earn a greater percentage of their total income from investments
than other taxpayers.7 Because investment income has preferential tax treat-
ment, the federal tax system imposes lower effective rates on some people
with more income than it does on others with less.8 That’s not how the rate
structure was supposed to operate: the federal income tax has graduated mar-
ginal rates that rise as total income rises, designed so that higher income
households pay a higher average rate of tax than lower income households.
When preferential rates on investment income allow high-income taxpayers
to reduce their average effective tax rate, those rates undermine the progres-
sivity of a graduated rate structure.
Undermining progressivity is not the only problem with the tax sys-
tem’s disparate treatment of income from different sources, and the trouble
4 I.R.C. §§ 3101, 3111 (2006) impose tax on wages, defined in I.R.C. § 3121(a) (2006).
There is an exception to this: a 3.8% Medicare tax on net investment income of high-income
taxpayers. Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1411,
124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified at I.R.C. § 1411(a)(1) (Supp. V 2011)). It is not a tax on
payroll, but on investments and is paid on the income tax return. See Questions and Answers
on the Net Investment Income Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/News-
room/Net-Investment-Income-Tax-FAQs (last updated Aug. 8, 2013), archived at http://perma.
cc/0KZQoCm3MKB.
5 More than 90% of families are taxed on every dollar. See THOMAS HUNGERFORD, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL33943, INCREASING THE SOCIAL SECURITY PAYROLL TAX BASE: OPTIONS
AND EFFECTS ON TAX BURDENS summary (2013), available at http://www.aging.senate.gov/
crs/ss28.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0dgTcpyaJ81.
6 Mitt Romney made the 47% number famous in a speech surreptitiously taped and re-
leased to Mother Jones magazine. Watch: Full Secret Video of Private Romney Fundraiser,
MOTHER JONES (Sept. 18, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/09/
watch-full-secret-video-private-romney-fundraiser, archived at http://perma.cc/0wSFT5QiU
1u. 7The number has declined to 43%. Who Doesn’t Pay Federal Taxes?, TAX POL’Y CTR.,
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/federal-taxes-households.cfm (Last visited Oct. 22,
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/0Pj5L4GdVRq.
7 See JUSTIN BRYAN, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, 2010, IRS STATISTICS OF INCOME
BULLETIN 10 fig.F (2012), http://www.irs.gov/PUP/taxstats/productsandpubs/12infallbulin
come.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0eDkzjyJCSK (showing that capital gains and dividends
taxed at preferential rates in 2010 constituted about half of total income of taxpayers with
adjusted gross income in excess of $10 million, but less than 1% for all taxpayers with ad-
justed gross income under $50,000).
8 See id. (showing that the highest category of taxpayers paid an average income tax rate
of 20.7% in 2010, while the moderately rich with $1–1.5 million paid an average tax of
24.9%). A regressive income tax system is one in which the average rate of tax declines as
income rises. In a progressive system, rates rise as income rises.
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extends beyond the super-rich. The discrepancy in the taxation of investment
income and labor income is a fairness issue for all taxpayers. Taxpayers who
earn the same amount—at all income levels—may pay vastly different
amounts of tax depending on how they earned the money. The payroll tax
produces substantial inequity between wage earners and investors with the
same total income, and the income tax exacerbates that inequity by taxing
wage earners more heavily in addition to the payroll tax.
The goal of this article is to draw attention to the payroll tax’s role in
the overall design of federal taxation, and to analyze the difference in the tax
burden imposed on income from work and income from investment in the
system as a whole. While academics and politicians perpetually debate the
fairness of the income tax, the payroll tax is virtually ignored—it is taken for
granted. A mythology surrounding the payroll tax has protected it from
meaningful critique. The connection between payroll taxes and Social Secur-
ity retirement benefits has lulled working Americans into accepting heavy
burdens on labor income as a fair price for retirement benefits. The mythol-
ogy of the payroll tax as insurance and private savings has minimized criti-
cism of a regressive tax that burdens people who work. It is ironic that a
conceptualization originally created to benefit workers—by making retire-
ment security a right for people who have worked—has transformed into a
justification for an outsize burden on them.
The payroll tax affects too many people and raises too much revenue to
remain outside the core debate about tax fairness. The disproportionate bur-
den that the tax system imposes on workers compared to investors under
current law lacks valid justification on fairness grounds. It is time to start
treating the payroll tax as a tax and subjecting it to rigorous examination to
determine whether it contributes to a just distribution of the tax burden.9
Because Social Security retirement is a worthy federal program, we should
be willing to pay for it with taxes that distribute the burden fairly. As Con-
gress and the President undertake tax reform, they should lighten the federal
tax burden from the backs of workers and make individuals earning income
from capital pay their fair share.
A. Income from Labor Is More Heavily Taxed than Income from Capital
Although the federal income tax and the federal payroll tax are different
taxes, governed by different chapters of the United States Code,10 they are
both federal taxes imposed on many of the same individuals. In fact, they
9 If the tax system’s treatment of retirement savings is analyzed along with the Social
Security system, the combined system reveals “a far less redistributive, and thus less justice-
enhancing, national retirement security program than emerges from looking at Social Security
benefits alone.” Michael Graetz, The Troubled Marriage Of Retirement Security And Tax Poli-
cies, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 873 (1987).
10 The individual income tax is covered by Chapters 1–5 of the Internal Revenue Code,
while the payroll tax is covered by Chapters 21–28.
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both impose tax on the same dollars because wages are taxed under the pay-
roll tax, and again under the income tax. Since fairness in taxation depends
on the distribution of total tax burdens, it is necessary to aggregate the bur-
dens under both taxes before deciding whether the federal tax system is
justly designed. Taken together, the combination of the income tax and the
payroll tax doubly burdens people who work for a living, compared to peo-
ple who live off their wealth.
By its terms, only labor income is taxed under the payroll tax—it is a
tax on “payroll.” In addition, labor income is disproportionately taxed under
the income tax. Although section 61 of the Code purports to treat all sources
of income the same—it includes “all income from whatever source de-
rived”—the tax law does not tax all income equally. The marginal rate struc-
ture, including the new 39.6% rate on high-income individuals, applies
mostly to income from labor because investment income is largely carved
out of the “ordinary” income subject to tax at graduated rates. Long-term
capital gains and dividends are privileged by a preferential rate that is cur-
rently a maximum of 20%.11 The only investment income taxed at ordinary
rates is interest. While a preference for capital gain is a longstanding feature
of the income tax, dividends were taxed as ordinary income until 2003. Con-
sequently, the starkness of the contrast between capital income and labor
income taxation is relatively new; only in the last decade has the divide
between capital and labor income taxation been so striking within the in-
come tax itself.
The combined effect of the payroll tax and the income tax produce dra-
matically heavier tax liabilities on labor income compared to capital income,
which means that workers are taxed more heavily than investors. As Mitt
Romney and Warren Buffett show, this combination can be a boon for
higher earners. The rich have more investments than the poor.12 On account
of this distribution of wealth, income that derives from wealth is heavily
skewed toward the rich, and the discrepancy in tax imposed on labor and
capital income benefits high-income taxpayers. Income from wealth enjoys
advantageous treatment under both the income tax and the payroll tax—
11 As a result of the recent fiscal cliff legislation, Section 1(h) of the Internal Revenue
Code imposes a 20% maximum rate for “adjusted net capital gain.” I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(D) (West
2013). That amount includes gains from sales of investment property held longer than a year.
I.R.C. §§ 1222, 1223 (2006). There are a few exceptions from the most preferential rate: col-
lectibles and unrecaptured depreciation on real estate are taxed at higher rates, I.R.C.
§ 1(h)(1)(E)–(F) (West 2013), as well as gains on investments held for a short period. With a
minimum of planning, taxpayers can make sure that all their gains are taxed at the most prefer-
ential rates.
12 The top 10% of the income distribution holds over $400,000 in asset wealth for every
$35,264.42 in wealth held by the bottom 20%. See FED. RESERVE BANK, CHANGES IN U.S.
FAMILY FINANCES FROM 2007 TO 2010 30 tbl.6 (2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/pubs/bulletin/2012/pdf/scf12.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0godfiGbvaW. Ninety per-
cent of families in the top income decile hold stocks, compared to 12% for households in the
bottom quintile. See id. at 41 tbl.7.
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investment income is exempt from the payroll tax13 and is subject to prefer-
ential rates in the income tax.14 While low-income taxpayers can enjoy a
zero rate on capital gains,15 they have precious little investment income
taxed that way.16
In addition to changes in the law that have made the preference for
capital gains and dividends more generous,17 inequity in the taxation of capi-
tal and labor income has grown over time because the economic returns to
capital and labor have diverged. Capital income has enjoyed an increasing
share of corporate returns while labor has reaped less. “[T]he shift away
from labor incomes towards capital incomes plays a significant role in driv-
ing the rise in overall income inequality . . . . [T]his labor-to-capital
shift explains about a third of the overall rise in the share of total income
claimed by the top 1 percent.”18 Given that the top 1% has captured 62% of
total income growth over the last generation,19 the labor-to-capital shift is an
important phenomenon. The tax law reinforces the effects of this economic
polarization by taxing the type of income earned by lower-income individu-
als more heavily than the type of income earned by higher-income
individuals.
While generally understood as a problem of vertical equity, the payroll
tax/income tax preference in favor of investment income also creates hori-
zontal inequity—two taxpayers with the same total income can pay very
different amounts of tax depending on whether their income was earned
through work or through investment. The horizontal inequity of the current
scheme applies throughout the income spectrum; lower income investors are
taxed less than equal-earning workers and high-income investors are taxed
less than equal-earning salaried employees.
13 Under the Affordable Care Act, there is an unearned income Medicare tax of 3.8% on
investment income for single taxpayers with income exceeding $200,000. Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1402(a)(1) (Pub. L. 111–152, 124 Stat. 1029). Health-
care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–152, § 1402(a)(1), 124 Stat.
1029 (2010) (codified at I.R.C. § 1411 (Supp. V 2011)).
14 I.R.C. § 1(h) (West 2013). Depending on a taxpayer’s marginal rate, adjusted net capital
gains and dividends are taxed at either 0%, 15%, or 20%.
15 I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(B) (West 2013).
16 See Bryan, supra note 7, at 10 fig.F. R
17 Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, there was a brief time when capital gains were not
subject to a preference at all. JOINT COMM. TAXATION STAFF, 99th CONG., GENERAL EXPLANA-
TION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 178 (Comm. Print 1987), available at http://www.jct.
gov/jcs-10-87.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0pV85XJdsPp. From 1993 until this year, an
unusually low 15% rate was in effect for capital gains and dividends. Federal Capital Gains
Tax Rates, 1988-2013, TAX FOUND. (June 13, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/article/federal-
capital-gains-tax-rates-1988-2013, archived at http://perma.cc/0rdbp9t1Tav.
18 Josh Bivens, More Fiscal Implications of a Rising Capital-Share of Income, ECON. POL-
ICY INST. BLOG (Jan. 2, 2013, 2:36 PM), http://www.epi.org/blog/fiscal-implications-rising-
capital-share-income/ (considering the years 1979–2007), archived at http://perma.cc/0XiD
gaehaUE.
19 EMMANUEL SAEZ, DEPT. OF ECON., U. OF CAL., STRIKING IT RICHER: THE EVOLUTION
OF TOP INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES 4, available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-US
topincomes-2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0CYLVa6iBKs.
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B. Payroll Taxes are Underexamined
The payroll tax is the stepchild in tax policy.20 It has a much lower
public profile than the income tax, and has been the subject of much less
scholarly debate. I have called it the “furtive tax”21 because people may fail
to notice their payroll tax payments. Individuals do not file annual payroll
tax returns, and never write a check for their payroll taxes. Instead, payroll
taxes are withheld by employers and remitted directly to the government,
without any participation by the employees who pay them. Even when pay-
roll taxes change, some taxpayers do not seem to notice the adjustment in
their withholding.22
This is unfortunate because the payroll tax is economically crucial to
both government and taxpayers. Payroll taxes produce 40% of total federal
tax revenue, about the same as income taxes.23 Its share has gradually grown
over time—in 1970, the payroll tax’s revenue share was 23% and in 1950, its
share was only 11% of total revenue.24 By contrast, the corporate income tax
produces less than 9% of total revenue, so even though it is hotly debated in
Washington and academia, from the perspective of revenue, the corporate
20 Academic interest in the income tax is overwhelming by comparison. There was a flurry
of interest in the payroll tax when a conversion to private accounts was being considered as
part of Social Security reform. See, e.g., R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & ALICIA
H. MUNNELL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., FRAMING THE SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE: VALUES,
POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS (1998). Privatization was an important campaign issue for President
George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COMM’N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. SEC.,
STRENGTHENING SOCIAL SECURITY AND CREATING PERSONAL WEALTH FOR ALL AMERICANS
(2001), available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/pcsss/Final_report.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/0cnRxxPQswB; Greg Hitt, Social Security Plan Stalls —- Stock Market’s Slide
Undermines Support for Privatization, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2002, at A4; Jackie Calmes, Bush
Pushes Action on Social Security — Bennett, DeMint Are Asked to Move Forward With Their
Conflicting Proposals, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2005, at A4, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/0,,SB111938082139765503,00.html, archived at http://perma.cc/0BSZLsTNkUw;
Mark Silva, Bush: Vote is Mandate, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 5, 2004, at C1, available at http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/2004-11-05/news/0411050276_1_second-term-agenda-president-bush-
clear-mandate, archived at http://perma.cc/0FnexBkrSBy; John D. McKinnon, Plans to Mend
Social Security Win Some Praise, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2004, at A2; Jacob M. Schlesinger,
Bush Plan To Privatize Social Security Will Face Host of Hurdles, Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 2000, at
A24.
21 Linda Sugin, The Furtive Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2013, at SR7, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/opinion/sunday/payroll-tax-returns-anyone.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/0atpgf2UDjG.
22 The temporary payroll tax holiday in 2011 and 2012 increased take-home pay for work-
ers. In a survey about uses of funds, some respondents did not realize that their withholding
had changed. See GRANT GRAZIANI, WILBERT VAN DER KLAAUW & BASIT ZAFAR, FED. RE-
SERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REP. NO. 592, A BOOST IN THE PAYCHECK: SURVEY EVIDENCE ON
WORKERS’ RESPONSE TO THE 2011 PAYROLL TAX CUTS 9 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2197793, archived at http://perma.cc/0uMDoukK6pC.
23 This is the number for 2010, the last year without a tax holiday. OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013 HISTORICAL TABLES 33
tbl.2.2 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/
assets/hist.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0DMjK8c6hKV.
24 Id. (providing historical data).
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tax is substantially less important than the payroll tax.25 The tax rates applied
to payroll have also risen over time. When the tax was first adopted in 1937,
the rate was 1% on both employers and employees. In 1950, it was still only
1.5%, and in 1970, 4.8%. Today, the rate for both employers and employees
is 7.65%.26 These climbing rates, along with increased labor productivity,
explain why the payroll tax’s share of federal revenue has increased so sub-
stantially over time.
From the perspective of individual taxpayers, the payroll tax is the sin-
gle most important tax. Virtually every taxpayer in the bottom two quintiles
of the income distribution—and about 70% of taxpayers in the middle quin-
tile—pays more payroll tax than income tax.27 Overall, about 60% of taxpay-
ers pay more payroll tax than income tax.28 The income tax exceeds the
payroll tax only for the top quintile of taxpayers29; the income tax is really a
high-income issue, while the payroll tax is important to taxpayers at all in-
come levels.
It would be hard to argue that the payroll tax is fair.30 Unlike the in-
come tax, it allows no adjustments for ability to pay. While income tax lia-
bility depends on whether a taxpayer supports children or gives to charity,
for example, the payroll tax does not.31 It is a flat-rate levy on the wage base.
Workers pay their 7.65% on the very first dollar earned—there is no stan-
dard deduction, personal exemption, or zero-bracket amount. Their employ-
ers pay an additional 7.65% on the same comprehensive base.32 These
combined levies impose a substantial burden on taxpayer-workers because
employers shift their part of the tax to workers by adjusting wages down-
ward.33 That means that low-and moderate-income workers bear a higher
average rate of tax—at least 15.3%—than Mitt Romney.34 In contrast, an
25 Self-employed individuals pay at twice that rate, 15.3%, essentially paying both the
employer and the employee portions of the tax. Id.
26 Social Security and Medicare Tax Rates, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/oact/
progdata/taxRates.html (last updated Mar. 8, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/0h1xyV37
daD.
27 Historical Payroll Tax vs. Income Tax, supra note 2. R
28 Id.
29 Over 90% of top quintile taxpayers pay more income tax than payroll tax. Id.
30 Twenty-five years ago, Michael Graetz stated, “the real fairness problems with social
security are the regressivity of its tax structure and its modest capacity to maintain the standard
of living of low and moderate wage earners.” Graetz, supra note 9, at 851. R
31 The income tax has myriad adjustments for the differing circumstances of individuals.
The complexity of the individual income tax is the product of attempting to make fine distinc-
tions between individuals’ financial circumstances.
32 Since its original adoption, payroll tax rates have risen twenty-one times, from 2%
(from 1937–1949) to 15.3% today. See Social Security and Medicare Tax Rates, supra note 26.
33 See HUNGERFORD, supra note 5, at 1 n.4 (“Most economists agree that workers ulti- R
mately bear the full burden of the payroll tax. Employers typically pass on their share of the
payroll tax to employees through paying lower wages.”).
34 For example, a hypothetical single, childless taxpayer in 2013 with wages in excess of
$14,340 will owe payroll tax (including the employer and employee portion) of 15.3% on
those wages. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN, REV. PROC. 2013-
15 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/2013-05_IRB/ar06.html (containing inflation
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Chart 1: Payroll and Income Tax Rates by Quintile
individual is unlikely to have a 15% average rate of income tax until earn-
ings exceed $70,000.35
Even without a comparison to the income tax, the design of the payroll
tax itself is inequitable because it is regressive—the average rate of tax goes
down as income goes up. The payroll tax is capped at $113,700 in earn-
adjustments for 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/06vjx4chEBv. The earned income tax
credit, I.R.C. § 32 (West 2013), reduces the effective rate of tax for individuals with less wage
income than that threshold because it operates to subsidize earnings below the statute’s
phaseout amount. See id.
35 A hypothetical single taxpayer in 2013 with AGI of $70,000, taking the standard deduc-
tion pays $10,929 in income tax, an average rate of 14.5%. Tax Calculator, TAX POL’Y CTR.,
http://calculator.taxpolicycenter.org (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
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ings.36 Employees with wages exceeding that amount pay no tax on their
excess earnings. An individual with income equal to twice the cap pays an
average rate of tax equal to only half the statutory rate. An individual’s aver-
age tax rate indicates how much that individual is burdened by a tax because
average rates compare total tax paid to an individual’s total income.37 Aver-
age rates of tax are the most important element in judging the fairness of a
tax. They are important for evaluating whether the government takes too
much of a person’s overall available resources. While marginal rates (i.e. the
rate paid on a person’s last dollar) may be more salient in public discourse,
from a fairness perspective, they are less important than average rates be-
cause marginal rates give no indication about the burden of taxation on indi-
viduals.38 Most people favor proportional or progressive taxes over
regressive ones because they believe that people with more resources should
pay a greater share of total tax.39 Nevertheless, as the story of the “fiscal
cliff” shows, there was barely a peep when the payroll tax rose at the begin-
ning of 2013.
C. The Fiscal Cliff Legislation Allowed Payroll Taxes to Rise
Not only is the payroll tax underappreciated by taxpayers, it is also
underappreciated by lawmakers. For 2011 and 2012, the payroll tax took a
partial “holiday” during which it was reduced by 2% to 4.2% for employ-
ees.40 The fiscal stimulus legislation in which the payroll tax holiday was
included was adopted to alleviate the effects of the recession, and the pur-
pose of the payroll tax holiday was to get more money into the hands of
36 This is the 2013 cap, applicable to the retirement portion (OASDI), which rises over
time. The HI (Medicare) portion is not subject to the cap. Social Security and Medicare tax
rates; maximum taxable earnings, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://ssa-custhelp.ssa.gov/app/answers/
detail/a_id/240/~/social-security-and-medicare-tax-rates%3B-maximum-taxable-earnings (last
updated Sept. 12, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/0iD3QhVo3V1. Beginning in 2013, an
additional HI tax of 0.9% is assessed on earned income exceeding $200,000 for individuals
and $250,000 for married couples filing jointly. Social Security and Medicare Tax Rates, supra
note 26. R
37 Average rates are also called “effective” rates. Since the payroll tax is at a single rate,
individuals with earnings below the cap pay tax at the same average rate and marginal rate.
38 The graduated marginal rate structure in the federal income tax imposes tax at in-
framarginal rates in addition to marginal rates. A person with a marginal rate of 39.6% pays
that rate on last dollars, but pays at all the statutory lower rates on dollars below the top rate
break. Thus, a person with a marginal rate of 39.6% is likely to pay an average rate signifi-
cantly lower. For example, in 2007, taxpayers in the top quintile paid an average income tax
rate of only 14.5%, much below the top statutory rate of 35%. See Jeff Rohaly, The Distribu-
tion of Federal Taxes, 115 TAX NOTES 1293 (2007).
39 See generally, JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD, What’s Fair? American Beliefs About Distribu-
tive Justice 280 (1981).
40 The tax was reduced to 4.2% for employees and 10.4% for the self-employed. Tax
Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No.111-312, 124 Stat. 3296. For an explanation of the payroll tax holiday, see JOINT COMMIT-
TEE ON TAXATION, JCS–2–13, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE
112TH CONGRESS 81–83 (2013), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=
download&id=4509&chk=4509&no_html=1, archived at http://perma.cc/044Z5uoM2Fd.
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individuals likely to spend it.41 The payroll tax holiday increased the take-
home pay of every worker in proportion to wage income. It was originally
adopted for only one year, but was extended through 2012 as the economy
lagged.42 The payroll tax reduction replaced a more progressive provision
that had been included in the prior round of fiscal stimulus, the “Making
Work Pay” credit.43 That provision, adopted in 2009, provided a refundable
tax credit to the lowest income earners, but did not benefit higher income
taxpayers as much as the payroll tax holiday.44
At the end of 2012, Congress and the President had to decide what to
do with expiring legislation, including stimulus provisions and other tax re-
ductions. Starting in 2001, numerous tax provisions were adopted with ex-
plicit sunset dates, at which time the law was scheduled to revert to its prior
form.45 The “fiscal cliff” at the end of 2012 was the reckoning for many of
those temporary provisions; if Congress had failed to act, taxes would have
risen for most individuals.46 The expiring provisions included lower margi-
nal rates, a reduced estate tax, a larger exemption for the alternative mini-
mum tax, a more generous earned income tax credit, and a payroll tax rate
reduction. In the nick of time, the “American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012”
permanently extended many of the provisions that were most advantageous
to high-income taxpayers.47 While it allowed the top marginal rate to rise for
the very highest income taxpayers, it made lower marginal rates permanent
41 See DAWN NUSCHLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41648, SOCIAL SECURITY: TEMPO-
RARY PAYROLL TAX REDUCTION summary (2012), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
R41648_20120109.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/03pRVVY8RW1.
42 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296.
43 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
The Make Work Pay credit expired at the end of 2010. It provided a 6.2% credit to wage-
earning taxpayers, with a maximum $400 credit. Taxpayers earning less than $20,000 benefit-
ted more from the Make Work Pay credit than from the payroll tax holiday. See NUSCHLER,
supra note 41 at 5. R
44 Because the credit was 6.2% of wages, for the lowest income taxpayers, the Making
Work Pay credit was more valuable than a 2% reduction in the payroll tax rate. See American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
45 The original “sunset” date for the 2001 legislation was December 31, 2010. Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901, 115 Stat. 38.
Most of the expiring provisions in the 2001 legislation were extended through 2012 by the Tax
Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010. Pub. L. No.
111-312 (2010), 124 Stat. 3296.
46 See ROBERTON WILLIAMS, ERIC TODER, DONALD MARRON & HANG NGUYEN, TAX
POL’Y CTR., TOPPLING OFF THE FISCAL CLIFF: WHOSE TAXES RISE AND HOW MUCH? 1 (2012),
available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/412666-toppling-off-the-fiscal-
cliff.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0iV6VTSNFiM (“Almost 90 percent of Americans would
see their taxes rise if we topple off the cliff.”).
47 For a description of major provisions in the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, see
generally JAMES NUNNS & JEFFREY ROHALY, TAX POL’Y CTR., TAX PROVISIONS IN THE AMERI-
CAN TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT OF 2012 (ATRA) (2013), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.
org/UploadedPDF/412730-Tax-Provisions-in-ATRA.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0FQ-
szy2Ywv7. For revenue estimates, see JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EF-
FECTS OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN AN AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A
SUBSTITUTE TO H.R.8, THE “AMERICAN TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT OF 2012,” AS PASSED BY THE
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\51-1\HLL104.txt unknown Seq: 11 30-JAN-14 8:28
2014] Payroll Taxes, Mythology, and Fairness 123
for most income,48 permanently patched the alternative minimum tax, and
permanently reduced the scope of the estate tax. It also provided for a per-
manent 20% maximum rate for capital gains and dividends.49 Expiring pro-
visions benefitting lower income taxpayers fared less well, with the expiring
enhancements to the earned income credit50 and the higher education credit51
extended only through 2017.52
The big loser in the fiscal cliff legislation was the payroll tax holiday.
The tax holiday was allowed to expire completely at the end of 2012 amid
widespread political indifference to extending it.53 According to the Con-
gressional Budget Office, the expiration raises $108 billion revenue in 2013
alone54—a significant sum even by federal budget standards. There was con-
siderable debate in government and the popular media about the income
level at which marginal rates would be allowed to rise to pre-2001 levels,55
but the payroll tax expired with virtually no discussion. Although Demo-
SENATE ON JANUARY 1, 2013 (2013), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?
func=startdown&id=4497, archived at http://perma.cc/0gS7vupoMUm.
48 Even the highest income taxpayers benefit from the lower marginal rates in the gradu-
ated schedule. See Rohaly, supra note 38, at 1293. R
49 In the fiscal cliff negotiations, there was conflict over whether to maintain the 15% rate
adopted as part of the Bush tax cuts, or allow the rate to rise to 20%, as it had been previously.
See Lori Montgomery & Paul Kane, As ‘Cliff’ Nears, McConnell and Biden in Talks, WASH.
POST, Dec. 31, 2012, at A1, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-31/busi-
ness/36070958_1_income-taxes-rise-fiscal-cliff-estate-tax, archived at http://perma.cc/0Lhgk
WiSiC7; Lori Montgomery & Zachary A. Goldfarb, Obama, Boehner Again Prepare to Tackle
Debt, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2012, at A8, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/
2012-11-08/business/35506134_1_obama-and-boehner-tax-code-rates-for-investment-income,
archived at http://perma.cc/0cqMSBaSHMq; James B. Stewart, Tax Plan Is Popular, But Not
Quite Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/
15/business/plan-to-cap-deductions-is-setback-for-charities.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
06ymt2gUp4H.
50 I.R.C. § 32 (West 2013).
51 American Opportunity Tax Credit, I.R.C § 25A (West 2013).
52 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 103, 126 Stat. 2319
(codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 25A, 32 (West 2013)).
53 Ross Douthat, Our Enemy, The Payroll Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2012, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sunday/douthat-our-enemy-the-payroll-tax.html?
ref=opinion&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/0MRgXJbXK6A.
54 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2013
TO 2023 at 14 (2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/
43907-BudgetOutlook.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0SkYEdp72YX.
55 See, e.g., Talks Ongoing for Fiscal Cliff (CNN television broadcast Dec. 30, 2012); Lori
Montgomery & Paul Kane, Obama, GOP Reach Fiscal Deal, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2013, at A7,
available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-31/business/36070958_1_income-
taxes-rise-fiscal-cliff-estate-tax, archived at http://perma.cc/0JpCMBuRhJY; Paul Kane, As
‘cliff’ nears, will McConnell be a dealmaker?, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2012, at A1, available at
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-22/politics/36016655_1_fiscal-cliff-tax-cuts-vice-
president-biden, archived at http://perma.cc/03CScZ2tw8S; Lori Montgomery & Paul Kane,
Offer Revives Talks on ‘Cliff’, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2012, at A17, available at http://arti-
cles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-16/business/35863991_1_debt-limit-boehner-and-obama-
national-debt, archived at http://perma.cc/0AfwjS4ZjtP. Congress decided to reinstate the
39.6% marginal rate at $400,000 taxable income for singles and $450,000 for joint filers.
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 101, 126 Stat. 2319 (codified
at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (West 2013)).
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cratic Representative Chris Van Hollen argued that the payroll tax holiday
should be extended, he seemed more concerned about its economic benefits
than its unfairness.56 Larry Summers also advocated for its extension, solely
because it provided economic stimulus.57 Aside from them, and a few
others,58 Congress and the media were largely silent about the expiring pay-
roll tax cut.59 The last, real challenge to the payroll tax on equity grounds
was a brief one from Senator John McCain, in a statement he made in
2009.60 He proposed a temporary 3.1% payroll tax cut for employees on the
grounds that the tax imposed too heavy a burden on working people.61
Given the economy’s continuing sluggishness, allowing payroll taxes to
rise, while preserving other cuts, was counterproductive. Before the fiscal
cliff negotiations, the Congressional Budget Office had estimated that the
payroll tax cut was the most cost-effective tax-based economic stimulant in
the package under review—more effective than extending the Bush tax cuts
or the alternative minimum tax patch. Only direct spending targeted to the
poor was considered more stimulative.62 After its expiration, the Office of
Management and Budget credited the payroll tax holiday with sustaining
economic demand and fostering economic growth, calling it the “culmina-
tion” of the government’s economic recovery efforts.63 As shown above,
when legislators, journalists and pundits should have been talking about the
56 See Suzy Khimm, Chris Van Hollen Wants to Consider Another Payroll Tax Holiday,
WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/
2012/10/22/chris-van-hollen-wants-to-consider-another-payroll-tax-holiday/, archived at http:/
/perma.cc/0gQiLwUoEix.
57 Lori Montgomery, Larry Summers: Keep the Payroll Tax Cut, WASH. POST, Oct. 11,
2012, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-11/business/35500653_1_pay-
roll-tax-budget-deficits-sluggish-growth, archived at http://perma.cc/06djrXM23nS.
58 Senator Robert Casey was the sole sponsor of a bill to extend the payroll tax holiday; it
died in committee. Middle Class & Small Business Tax Cut Act 2012, S. 3660, 112 Cong.
(2012); S. 3660 (112th): Middle Class & Small Business Tax Cut Act of 2012, GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s3660 (last visited Nov. 10, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/0WhZVG1DqAA; see generally 158 CONG. REC. S7419 (daily ed. Dec. 5,
2012).
59 See Douthat, supra note 53. R
60 Statement by Senator John McCain on the Floor of the United States Senate, U.S. SENA-
TOR JOHN MCCAIN (Oct. 15 2009), http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAc-
tion=PressOffice.FloorStatements&ContentRecord_id=58B50118-BB3A-1744-4379-CD7B
AB997F3F, archived at http://perma.cc/0qyWvVSia9P.
61 Ironically, several congressmen raised the concern of regressivity and burden on work-
ers in opposition to Speaker Pelosi’s payroll tax proposal to finance the Affordable Care Act.
155, pt. 15 CONG. REC. 20,564 (2009).
62 The estimated economic impact of those policies per dollar of budgetary cost is
larger than that of extending other expiring tax provisions and indexing the AMT for
inflation because a larger share of the additional unemployment benefits and ex-
tended payroll tax cut would be spent by the recipients in 2013. As a result, the
short-run increase in aggregate demand and output would be greater.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF POLICIES CONTRIBUTING TO FISCAL TIGHTEN-
ING IN 2013 11 (2012). Only direct spending targeted to the poor was considered more stimula-
tive. See id.
63 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, MID-SESSION REVIEW BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERN-
MENT. FISCAL YEAR 2014 5 (2013).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\51-1\HLL104.txt unknown Seq: 13 30-JAN-14 8:28
2014] Payroll Taxes, Mythology, and Fairness 125
expiration of the payroll tax cut, nobody seemed interested. Only after it
expired and when workers noticed the hit to their paychecks did anyone start
to express concern.64 On April 5, 2013, Floyd Norris of the New York Times
wrote: “Raising taxes on the least well-off working people—through the
payroll tax increase that took effect at the beginning of the year—might
have been a poor idea.”65 Why did Congress and the President accept expira-
tion of the payroll tax reduction as inevitable, but fight so hard over raising
the top marginal rate in the income tax? Why did people accept it as inevita-
ble that the payroll tax holiday would expire,66 when they did not accept as
inevitable that other 2001 tax cuts would expire? This article argues that the
New Deal rhetoric surrounding Social Security, and the mythology that pay-
roll taxes are premium payments for social insurance, largely explain why
the payroll tax holiday fell off the fiscal cliff at the end of 2012. It contends
that what started as a scheme to ensure that government would commit long-
term to reducing poverty among the elderly has been perverted to justify
disproportionate tax burdens on workers.
II. FAIRNESS AND TAXATION OF WAGES
A. Wages Bear the Heaviest Total Tax Burden
The payroll tax burden on labor income must be evaluated against the
backdrop of more preferential income tax treatment for capital income.
Given the favored treatment of capital income under the income tax, the
regressivity of the payroll tax is particularly troubling because it means that
individuals with wealth (and the capital income it produces) reap benefits
under both regimes. The payroll tax imposes a heavier relative levy on tax-
payers with total wage income under the maximum income payroll cap,
compared to both workers with wages exceeding the cap and investors
whose income is exempt from the payroll tax. Such a levy is vertically ineq-
uitable since high-income individuals are treated more favorably under the
law than are low-income individuals. As Professor Michael Graetz wrote,
“The income tax benefits that are skewed in the direction of high-income
64 See Nelson Schwartz, Restored Payroll Tax Pinches Those Who Earn the Least, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 7, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/business/re-
stored-payroll-tax-pinches-those-with-the-smallest-checks.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
0AVS2rbU5Za.
65 Floyd Norris, The Shrinking Ranks of the Working, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Apr.
5, 2013, 10:25 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/the-shrinking-ranks-of-
the-working, archived at http://perma.cc/0p6aGWvX25g.
66 See Tony Nitti, Dear America: Your Higher Payroll Taxes Are Not The Result Of A Tax
Increase, FORBES (Jan. 14, 2013, 10:37 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2013/
01/14/dear-america-your-higher-payroll-taxes-are-not-the-result-of-a-tax-increase/, archived at
http://perma.cc/0PyzDipMFco.
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individuals render inexcusable the dramatic regressivity of the payroll tax
. . . .”67
While vertical equity is important, the most striking (and less well-
known) effect from combining the two taxes occurs in horizontal compari-
sons of people with the same income. Under 2013 law, a single individual
with $20,000 in wage earnings pays $3,700 in federal taxes, mostly payroll
taxes, but also including about $860 in income taxes.68 If that income had
been from long-term capital gains instead of earnings, the taxpayer would
have paid no federal tax at all because the payroll tax does not apply to non-
wage income, and the rate for long-term capital gains is zero for low-income
taxpayers.69 So the low-income wage earner pays more payroll tax and more
income tax than the low-income investor. The inequity occurs at every in-
come level. An individual with $45,000 wage earnings pays $10,700 in total
federal tax, $4300 of which is income tax, while an individual with $45,000
in long-term capital gains still pays no federal tax, even though $45,000 is
not poor for a single American.70 At $70,000, the worker pays $19,600 in
federal taxes, about half in payroll tax and half in income tax. The investor
pays $3560, only 18% of what the worker pays; the worker with $70,000
pays 5.5 times more tax than the investor earning the same amount.
The pattern continues at higher incomes also, but the payroll tax be-
comes less important and the discrepant treatment within the income tax
becomes more important. Payroll tax rates never rise,71 and capital gains
rates are capped at 20%.72 But income tax rates rise as total income rises, so
highly-paid wage earners pay the highest rates of tax under the law. At
$145,000, the worker is over the maximum taxable amount for the payroll
tax, so the effective rate of the payroll tax declines compared to taxpayers
below the cap.73 But the income tax rates rise, so that the high-wage worker
pays more income tax. The worker with $145,000 wages pays total federal
tax of $46,600, $18,000 of which is payroll tax.74 The investor with
$145,000 in capital gains pays $14,800 in income tax and no payroll tax. So
even where payroll taxes are a less significant portion of total tax liability for
67 Graetz, supra note 9, at 906. R
68 All numbers here were generated with the Tax Policy Center’s tax calculator. The calcu-
lator includes the employer’s share of the payroll tax as cash income and attributes both the
employer and employee portions of the payroll tax to the employee. See Tax Calculator, supra
note 35. R
69 I.R.C. §§ 1, 1401, 3101, 3111 (Supp. V 2011).
70 In 2011, the United States household median income was $50,054. CARMEN DENAVAS-
WALT et al., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2011 5 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-
243.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0HWL8LSDtkd.
71 I.R.C. §§ 1401, 3101, 3111 (Supp. V 2011).
72 I.R.C. § 1 (West 2013).
73 The taxpayer with $145,000 earnings and the taxpayer with $113,700 both pay the same
OASDI tax, $14,099, which is 12.4% of the lower earner’s wages, but only 9.7% of the higher
earner’s wages. Tax Calculator, supra note 35. R
74 Id. The health insurance portion of the payroll tax has no cap, so it is 2.9% of all
earnings. I.R.C. §§ 1401, 3101, 3111 (Supp. V 2011).
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the worker, the investor pays less than a third of the worker’s tax. At
$500,000, the worker pays $178,000 in tax, which includes the maximum
payroll tax plus an additional high-income Medicare tax on payroll adopted
as part of the Affordable Care Act.75 Her marginal income tax rate is the
highest—39.6%—under current law and her income tax liability is
$147,400. The investor with $500,000 in capital gains pays just under
$86,000 in income tax, less than half of the tax burden of the worker. The
following chart illustrates these comparisons:76
Chart 2: Total Tax Liability
Income (includes employer payroll tax contributions)
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Exacerbating the inequity in the taxation of labor income and capital
income is that, due to the realization rule, the real rate of tax applied to much
investment income is zero. The realization rule imposes tax on investment
gains only at the time an asset is sold,77 allowing accessions to wealth to
escape taxation. Accurate income measurement would tax gains as they ac-
crue, on a so-called “mark-to-market” basis, regardless of when the invest-
ment is sold. The classic definition of income underlying the federal income
tax includes the “net accretion to economic power” during the relevant time
75 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 9015, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (imposing additional hospital insurance tax on wages exceeding $200,000); Tax Calcu-
lator, supra note 35. R
76 These numbers assume that the taxpayer is single and claims the standard deduction. Id.
77 I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(4), 1001 (2006).
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period,78 and the “change in the value of the store of property rights.”79 This
understanding of income requires only valuation, not liquidation. Neverthe-
less, the federal income tax has always allowed unrealized gains to remain
untaxed.80 As long as an investment continues unliquidated, any built-in ap-
preciation remains tax-free.
This is a significant tax benefit for investors accumulating wealth be-
cause tax can be deferred indefinitely. Deferring the tax on gain has the
effect of reducing the effective rate of tax applied to that gain—the longer
the deferral, the lower the effective rate of tax becomes.81 Deferral becomes
forgiveness under current law if taxpayers hold investments until death be-
cause section 1014 of the Code steps up basis for heirs to fair market value
at death, erasing any gain that accrued on property during a decedent’s life.
Neither the decedent nor the heirs will ever pay income tax on that gain. The
realization rule allows taxpayers to choose when to include their gains, and
if they have sufficient assets to hold until death, whether to ever subject
those gains to income taxation at all.
The exclusion of unrealized gains from tax is an enormous benefit for
investing taxpayers, but it is largely ignored. The government treats it as
though it does not exist by failing to measure the realization rule’s annual
cost in lost revenue. The realization rule is not included in the tax expendi-
ture budget as an item of tax preference.82 While the exact amount may be
impossible to determine given current data, the magnitude is certainly
huge.83
The discrepancy between the taxation of labor and the taxation of in-
vestments could be substantially reduced if unrealized gains were subject to
taxation. Mark-to-market taxation of gains would require immediate inclu-
sion of all accretions to wealth, just as current law includes all financial
returns to labor as they occur. Mark-to-market taxation might even pave the
way for further uniformity in the taxation of labor and investment income
because the preference for capital gains might no longer be necessary. If the
78 ROBERT MURRAY HAIG ET AL., THE CONCEPT OF INCOME IN THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
7 (1921).
79 HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
80 Jeffrey L. Kwall, When Should Asset Appreciation Be Taxed?: The Case for a Disposi-
tion Standard of Realization, 86 IND. L.J., 77, 79 (2011).
81 A $10 gain subject to a 20% tax produces $2 tax currently. If that $2 tax is deferred for
10 years, the $2 tax to be paid then can be funded by only $1.50 today if it will grow at 3%.
The necessary current outlay goes down as the rate of return rises. If the $2 tax is deferred for
20 years, it can be funded with just over a dollar.
82 The realization rule was accepted in the normal baseline adopted by the original design-
ers of the tax expenditure concept. See STANLEY SURREY & PAUL MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDI-
TURES 3–4 (1985).
83 Looking at the five year moving average, from 2000 to 2006, the gap between the asset
appreciation and realized capital gains generally fluctuated between approximately two and
three trillion dollars a year. ARTHUR B. LAFFER & STEPHEN MOORE, RETURN TO PROSPERITY:
HOW AMERICA CAN REGAIN ITS ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER STATUS 183 (2011). Thus, the exclu-
sion of unrealized capital gains from the tax base excludes two to three trillion dollars a year
from the potential tax base.
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law’s lower rate for capital gains is necessary to encourage people to realize
their gains and pay the tax,84 then mark-to-market taxation would make it
unnecessary to provide that incentive. Since people would be taxed on their
gains regardless of sale, it would no longer matter—from a tax perspec-
tive—whether investors sold their positions or continued to hold.
Dispensing with the realization rule may not be as dramatic as people
might initially believe. At one time, the Supreme Court gave the impression
that the realization rule was constitutionally required.85 But its later interpre-
tation made it clear that realization is a matter of convenience and adminis-
trability that Congress can choose to abrogate where appropriate.86 Congress
has retained it for most investments, but has adopted mark-to-market taxa-
tion in limited circumstances where necessary to prevent abuse.87 Congress-
man Dave Camp has recently proposed a mark-to-market system for
derivatives88 that could create a toe-hold for a broader application of mark-
to-market rules. There have been many reasonable proposals to abrogate the
realization requirement.89 To extend the partial reach of mark-to-market
under current law, some proposals suggest limiting the investments covered
or the people subject to the regime.90 Short of taxing mark-to-market, Con-
gress can achieve the economic equivalent of a more accurate income tax by
taxing gain retrospectively with interest so that returns to capital are effec-
84 The higher the rate of tax on capital gains, the more the tax represents a toll charge on
changing investments. The higher the toll charge, the more attractive an alternative investment
must be to make the toll worthwhile because the amount that can be invested in the new
investment will be smaller (by the amount of the tax) than the amount currently invested in the
old investment.
85 See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920) (holding that stock dividends were
not taxable because they were not separated from the invested capital, and citing the Sixteenth
Amendment).
86 See, e.g., Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1940). Congress has, in fact, done
so. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 475 (2006) (requiring mark to market for dealers in securities); I.R.C.
§ 1256 (2006) (requiring mark to market for certain straddles).
87 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1256 (2006).
88 Tax Reform Act of 2013, H.R. _, 113th Cong., § 401 (draft as discussed by H. Comm.
on Ways and Means, Jan. 23, 2013), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploaded
files/leg_text_fin.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0wodoANqPkA. For a description of the
proposal, see generally H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF WAYS
AND MEANS DISCUSSION DRAFT: FINANCIAL PRODUCTS (2013), available at http://waysand
means.house.gov/uploadedfiles/summary_description_of_wm_discussion_draft_financial_pro
ducts.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/071L9nfkXid.
89 See generally David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual
Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986); Alvin C. Warren, Financial Contract Innovation
and Income Tax Policy, 107 HARV. L. REV. 460 (1993). For an analysis of the theoretical and
administrative issues in taxing unrealized gains, see David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy,
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1549 (1998).
90 See generally David S. Miller, A Progressive System of Mark to-Market Taxation, 121
Tax Notes 213 (2008) (proposing mark-to-market taxation to a small slice of very wealthy
taxpayers while maintaining realization for most taxpayers).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\51-1\HLL104.txt unknown Seq: 18 30-JAN-14 8:28
130 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 51
tively taxed.91 The realization rule is a source of substantial inequity and
should not be immune to reform.
In addition to the pervasive inequity of the realization rule, the income
tax is full of explicit preferences for all sorts of investment returns. There are
provisions in the law that exempt income on investments if the proceeds are
used for retirement,92 education,93 and health care.94 If you invest in your
house, the gain is tax-free when you sell,95 no matter what you use the pro-
ceeds for. They all contribute to the unequal taxation of labor and capital
income. Given these opportunities for sheltering, only a small portion of all
the income from investment gets taxed at all.
There is some nuance to this story. Many people do not fit neatly into
the labor-income or capital-income category; many have income from both
sources and are taxed under both legal regimes. In addition, the lowest in-
come workers are entitled to refundable tax credits that are not available to
low-income investors. While low-income workers must pay payroll tax on
their first dollars of earnings, they receive transfers under the income tax that
may exceed the payroll tax they pay.96 The size of the transfer depends on
earned income and children supported.97 Consequently, a very low-income
worker pays less under the federal tax system than the very low-income
investor.98 The low-income investor is not eligible for the earned income tax
credit because it only applies to wages earned.99 Nevertheless, the general
situation is quite clear: current law causes both horizontal inequity and verti-
cal inequity. Those with more investment income are taxed less than those
with more labor income, and the inequity between workers and investors
applies across income cohorts, as well as within them. The fairness argu-
91 See Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 167,
167 (1991); Noe¨l Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A “Revo-
lutionary” Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725, 733 (1992).
92 See I.R.C. §§ 401, 403, 408, 408A (2006).
93 See I.R.C. §§ 529–30 (2006).
94 See I.R.C. § 220, 223 (2006).
95 See I.R.C. § 121 (2006) (stating that the maximum excludible amount is $250,000 for
single filers and $500,000 for joint filers, and that excess gains are taxed as capital gains).
96 For example, a single worker with two children who earns $10,000 in 2013 receives a
refundable child tax credit and earned income tax credit under I.R.C. § 32 (West 2013) of
$4660—a negative income tax—and pays less than a third of that ($1420) in payroll taxes. See
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1040 INSTRUCTIONS 59 (2012), available at http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0CNSK5QLNnD. She receives a net
transfer from the government, for a negative effective tax rate.
97 See I.R.C. § 32 (West 2013).
98 Of course, the low-income investor has wealth, which the low-income wage earner
eligible for the credits does not, so the very low-income investor is likely to be substantially
better off financially than the very low-income worker.
99 See I.R.C. § 32(b) (West 2013). The earned income tax credit was originally adopted to
alleviate the burden of payroll taxes, and the amount allowed for childless taxpayers is pre-
cisely the rate of tax (7.65%) imposed statutorily on employees. So, for childless workers, the
earned income credit effectively refunds the payroll tax on the first dollars earned. Martin
Rein, Equality and Social Policy, 51 SOC. SERV. REV. 565, 575 (1977).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\51-1\HLL104.txt unknown Seq: 19 30-JAN-14 8:28
2014] Payroll Taxes, Mythology, and Fairness 131
ments for taxing different sources and uses of income differently demand
explication, and the next section turns to that task.
B. Fairness in Taxation Depends on Overall Burdens
What, precisely, is wrong with taxing income from wages more heavily
than income from capital? Fairness in taxation demands that individuals be
taxed equitably, but it may not require that all income be taxed the same. Just
because income from capital and income from labor are both income does
not automatically mean that a just system of taxation would treat them the
same. Nonetheless, income is a widespread tax base because it is a mecha-
nism for distributing the burdens of taxation equitably. Tax fairness demands
a metric for comparison, and the metric underlying an income tax is ability
to pay. The ability-to-pay norm has a long-established provenance.100 Adam
Smith wrote: “The subjects of every state ought to contribute to the support
of the government, as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective
abilities.”101 John Stuart Mill expanded on Smith’s principle by explaining
that allocating the tax burden based on respective abilities depends on the
burden that a tax places on a taxpayer: “whatever sacrifices [a government]
requires from [citizens] should be made to bear as nearly as possible with
the same pressure upon all.”102
How should we interpret the norms of “equal sacrifice” and “ability to
pay” in the context of taxes on income from labor and from capital? First, it
is important to aggregate all the taxes that a government imposes on an indi-
vidual; neither the payroll tax nor the income tax can be evaluated in isola-
tion. Total sacrifice depends on the sum total of taxes on people. That is why
it is important to compare the total federal tax burden—including both pay-
roll taxes and income taxes—on workers and investors.103 In addition to
taxes, the measure of net sacrifice relevant for justice must account for the
total benefits from government as well. If benefits are evenly distributed
throughout the population, then individual taxpayers’ sacrifices can be iso-
lated, and consequently, determined more easily. But if benefits are highly
progressive or regressive, taxes should be adjusted to maintain a fair distri-
bution of benefits and burdens overall. If government programs primarily
100 The ability-to-pay criterion enjoys broad acceptance as a fundamental tenet of tax jus-
tice, although the details of its implementation are controversial. Graetz, supra note 9, at 861. R
101 ADAM SMITH, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations V.2.25
(Edwin Cannan ed., Methuen & Co., 5th ed. 1904) (1776), available at http://www.econlib.
org/library/Smith/smWN.html, archived at http://perma.cc/0W3LKjQBisM. There is substan-
tial debate about what that principle requires in practice, but the abilities-based norm is clear.
102 JOHN STUART MILL, Principles of Political Economy, V.2.6 (William J. Ashley, ed.,
Longmans, Green and Co., 7th ed. 1909) (1848), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/
Mill/mlP.html, archived at http://perma.cc/0W3LKjQBisM.
103 See supra text accompanying notes 67–76.
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benefit low-income individuals, a more regressive tax can be justified than if
government programs primarily benefit high-income individuals.104
There are many tax systems that can be just, and only a few that are
categorically unjust.105 Taxes on many bases can be justified as long as they
leave individuals with the means to exercise individual agency—a confisca-
tory tax, on any base, is unjust.106 Labor income represents a combination of
returns to personal effort and returns to social institutions. Therefore, in a
just society, taxes on labor income are acceptable because, to the extent that
labor includes returns to social institutions, individuals lack an absolute right
to the fruits of their labor. A fair tax on labor would recognize the personal
contribution of workers in producing labor income, while also acknowledg-
ing that individuals cannot produce labor income without the social appara-
tus in which they labor. Too onerous a tax on labor income may devalue the
contribution of those who work by leaving them without the means to exer-
cise their autonomy. Thus, the outer limit on taxation of labor income comes
from the magnitude of the tax, not its tax base.107 Similarly, taxation of capi-
tal income is acceptable in a just system because holders of capital do not
have absolute rights to everything their money produces in the market. In
fact, the productivity of capital depends on the contributions of labor as well
as the social institutions that make capital productive. Capital income taxa-
tion can account for these substantial collective inputs.
The justness of a particular scheme of taxation depends largely on the
background institutions in place, against which the tax is imposed.108 The
challenge in designing a tax system is choosing which tax or combination of
taxes are the most just, given the non-tax institutions in place. From this
perspective, there is a compelling argument labor income should be taxed
less than capital income because labor income commands a person’s unique,
irreplaceable investment of the self. Capital income is not exclusive in the
same way, and does not require investment of an individual’s autonomy. The
rest of this section constructs this argument by refuting fairness claims for
taxing labor more heavily than capital, and explaining why the tax system
should not overburden labor.
104 See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice
14–15 (2002).
105 I have previously discussed this issue at length, and so far, I have taken the position
that only endowment taxation and a confiscatory tax that leaves an individual without suffi-
cient resources to exercise personal agency are per se unjust. See Linda Sugin, Theories of
Distributive Justice and Limitations on Taxation: What Rawls Demands From Tax Systems, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 1991, 1998 (2004) [hereinafter Sugin, Limitations] (“Numerous tax sys-
tems could conceivably satisfy Rawls’s principles of justice”); see generally Linda Sugin, A
Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model, 64 TAX L. REV. 229 (2011) [hereinafter
Sugin, Philosophical Objection] (arguing that endowment taxation is uniquely unjust).
106 See Sugin, Philosophical Objection, supra note 105, at 260 (“It is important whether R
government interference prevents a person from pursuing her conception of a meaningful
life.”).
107 See id. (“[A] 100% income tax would leave a person at the mercy of the state”).
108 See Sugin, Limitations, supra note 105, at 2000, 2009. R
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C. Arguments to Tax Wage Income More Heavily than Capital
Income are Deficient
1. Payroll Taxes Are Benefits Taxes
The only way to refute the unfairness of the payroll tax is to either deny
that it is a tax at all, or to rationalize it in the context of a broader analysis of
taxes and spending that offsets its regressivity. If it is not really a tax, then it
cannot be judged as unfairly regressive because regressivity is a critique of
taxes. Alternatively, regressive taxes can be justified on fairness grounds if
they finance progressive spending; the entire package of taxes and spending
can be distributed equitably to individuals in different economic positions.109
Even regressive taxes can be redistributive.110 Thus, to evaluate any defense
of the payroll tax, it is important to place it in the larger scheme of social
security retirement.
The payroll tax was adopted in 1935 as part of the Social Security Act,
which guaranteed retirement benefits for workers.111 The Act was a response
to the rise in poverty caused by the Great Depression, and it was important
to President Franklin Roosevelt that the program create an entitlement to
retirement security, rather than need-based assistance.112 An entitlement
would be harder to repeal than need-based assistance, particularly if individ-
uals had already earned the entitlement when Congress considered repealing
it.113 At that time, the income tax was not yet the “mass tax” that it is today,
so it was not considered a viable source for the funds that would be re-
109 If the proceeds of taxes collected are redistributed to provide the greatest benefit
to the least well-off—through whatever mechanism, whether direct transfers,
schools, health care, or other programs that open opportunity and improve the pros-
pects of the poorest—then it matters little what the tax itself looks like because the
spending side of the budget corrects or adjusts the distributional consequences
overall.
See Sugin, Limitations, supra note 105, at 1997. R
110 To illustrate, consider a society with two people, Rich and Poor. If Rich has $10,000 in
income and Poor has $1000, a $1000 tax on Rich (10%) and a $200 tax on Poor (20%) would
be regressive. But the government would have $1200 that it could spend entirely on Poor,
which would redistribute Rich’s $1000 to Poor and spend Poor’s $200 on him also. The spend-
ing side is a key part of the overall distributional fairness of the system. See MURPHY &
NAGEL, supra note 104, at 164. R
111 Franklin D. Roosevelt Statement on Signing the Social Security Act, AMERICAN PRESI-
DENCY PROJECT (Aug. 14, 1935), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?
pid=14916, archived at http://perma.cc/02RnxVUUCg6; Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-
271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
112 Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of Social
Security Privatization, 41 B.C. L. REV. 975, 981 (2000) (“The program’s guaranteed income
redistributive benefit formula promotes prevention rather than alleviation of poverty in old age
and extends the expectation of retirement to all income levels.”).
113 See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Women, Fairness, and Social Security,
82 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1213 (1997) (“The formal linkage between wages, contributions, and
benefits distinguishes social security from pure social welfare programs and reinforces the
widely-held perception of social security benefits as an ‘earned right.’”).
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quired.114 A new revenue supply needed to be tapped to finance the outlays,
and so the tax on payroll, at 1%, was created. The statutory authorization
was known as FICA, the shorthand for payroll tax payments widely under-
stood today, which stands for the “Federal Insurance Contributions Act.”115
At its birth, the payroll tax was portrayed as “insurance.” Calling the tax
payments “contributions to the social insurance system”116 gives them a sub-
stantially different connotation than simply calling them a tax, and that cog-
nitive frame has endured; it is the essential element in the mythology of the
payroll tax. Contributions to social insurance are connected to the benefits
of social insurance, and that connection is important in evaluating the fair-
ness of the system as a whole.
Payroll taxes and Social Security benefits are linked in two ways. The
first connection is a revenue link—payroll taxes fund Social Security bene-
fits.117 Every tax dollar collected from payroll taxes must be used—at some
time—to fund Social Security benefit payments. The tax revenue has mostly
been disbursed immediately because the system is pay-as-you-go, in which
current taxpayers finance the payments to current retirees. The first genera-
tion to receive benefits did not pay taxes into the system; the first lump sum
benefits were paid out in the same month in which Social Security taxes
were first collected.118
The second connection is an eligibility link—retirement benefits are
available only to people who have earned eligible wages for a sufficient
length of time. The law makes no explicit connection between taxes paid and
benefits received; the connection is implied by the earnings requirement in
the benefits formula. The earnings that entitle individuals to benefits are the
same earnings that are taxed under the payroll tax. Thus, a schematic over-
view of the relationship between payroll taxes and retirement benefits looks
like this: workers pay a flat rate of tax on their wage earnings up to a maxi-
mum, which has risen with average earnings over time; in 2013, that amount
114 See Carolyn Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion
of the Income Tax during World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685 (1988–89).
115 As the Social Security Administration explains on its website, “FICA is nothing more
than the tax provisions of the Social Security Act, as they appear in the Internal Revenue
Code.” What is the Meaning of FICA, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://ssa-custhelp.ssa.gov/app/an-
swers/detail/a_id/392/~/what-is-the-meaning-of-fica (last modified Jan. 28, 2013), archived at
http://www.perma.cc/0T7MdEWKDdM.
116 See id.
117 OASDI and SSI Snapshot and SSI Monthly Statistics, 72 SOC. SEC. BULL. 63, 67 (2012)
(showing payroll tax collections and benefits disbursements). Of the 15.3% collected in tax on
every dollar earned, the Social Security portion is 12.4%. This includes retirement security and
disability payments. The other 2.9% is for health. Social Security and Medicare tax rates;
maximum taxable earnings, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Sept. 12, 2012), http://ssa-custhelp.ssa.gov/
app/answers/detail/a_id/240/~/social-security-and-medicare-tax-rates%3B-maximum-taxable-
earnings, archived at http://perma.cc/0osUHY8Uctn.
118 January 1937. Frequently Asked Questions, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/his-
tory/hfaq.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2013), archived at http://www.perma.cc/0xukTDbSbwD.
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is $113,700.119 When a worker retires, a calculation is performed to deter-
mine retirement benefits.120 If a worker begins collecting benefits at full re-
tirement age (currently 66 years),121 the monthly benefit amount is
determined by averaging indexed monthly earnings over 35 years (AIME)122
and applying a stepped formula to that amount. The formula provides a
higher replacement rate for lower wages than for higher wages so that bene-
fits constitute a greater percentage of pre-retirement income for low-income
workers than for high-income workers.123 This formula is progressive be-
cause lower earners receive benefits equal to a higher percentage of the tax
base than higher income earners. But it is not as redistributive as it might
be—both high and low earners receive a 90% match on their first dollars,
and high earners receive substantially more total benefits than low earners.
Low earners receive a higher percentage of their earnings in benefits, but
high earners receive more dollars.124
The crux of the payroll tax mythology is that taxes on wages pay for
benefits connected to wages. Benefits taxes are like fees for government
services—individuals purchase the government services they personally en-
joy. A benefits tax mimics a market transaction. The widely held, but mis-
taken, notion that Social Security is like private savings invites a benefits
taxation framework: If the entitlement to retirement security comes from
having paid explicitly for it with payroll taxes over a lifetime, then retirees
are simply receiving what they bought, in a market sense. The problem with
this justification is that payroll taxes do not fit so well into a fee-for-services
119 Social Security and Medicare tax rates; maximum taxable earnings, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://ssa-custhelp.ssa.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/240/kw/113%2C700 (last modified Sept.
12, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/0hjhWGtMtmT.
120 See SOC. SEC. ADMIN, YOUR RETIREMENT BENEFIT: HOW IT IS FIGURED (2013), availa-
ble at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10070.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0uayzRyCv
ER. .
121 Full retirement age is currently 66, but it is scheduled to rise to 67 for individuals born
after 1960. Retirement Planner: Full Retirement Age, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/
retire2/retirechart.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/0PaGCzscuTY.
122 This stands for “average indexed monthly earnings.” The amount is computed by in-
dexing a worker’s earnings to reflect changes in wage levels. See Social Security Benefit
Amounts, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/COLA/Benefits.html#aime
(last visited Oct. 23, 2013), archived at http://www.perma.cc/0QLvA3uMiPW.
123 For new beneficiaries in 2013, benefits are 90% for the first $791 in AIME. Benefits
rise by 32 cents per dollar for AIME between $791 and $4768, and rise further by 15 cents for
AIME over that amount. See Primary Insurance Amount, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.
socialsecurity.gov/OACT/COLA/piaformula.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2013), archived at http://
www.perma.cc/0DYLkjpa7U.
124 For example, an individual with AIME of $600 receives $540 in monthly benefits,
while a person with an AIME of $5000 receives $2019 in benefits under the formula. (90% x
$791) + (32% x $3977) + (15% x $232) = $711.90 + $1272.64 + $34.80 = $2019.34. See
id. There is a minimum benefit, so low-earning retirees might receive more in benefits than
this formula provides, but very few people qualify for the special minimum benefit. CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS 28 (2010), available at http://www.cbo.
gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/115xx/doc11580/07-01-ssoptions_forweb.pdf, [herein-
after SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS], archived at http://perma.cc/0uN9viYTFhM.
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model, and even if they did, benefits taxes are generally an undesirable tax
scheme from the perspective of fairness.
The payroll tax does not operate like a benefits tax because the benefits
received are not well correlated to the taxes paid. If payroll taxes “buy”
retirement security, the price is arbitrary, depending on numerous factors
including lifespan, income, and marital status. Early participants in the pro-
gram received significantly more in retirement benefits than they had paid in
taxes. In contrast, Social Security is a bad “investment” for numerous work-
ers today because many individuals retiring now paid more in Social Secur-
ity taxes than they will receive in retirement benefits.125 For them, their
contributions were in the nature of a pure tax. There are also substantial
differences in the relationship between taxes and benefits among different
demographic groups. Some groups, like non-working spouses of high-in-
come taxpayers who receive widow benefits have disproportionally benefit-
ted under the scheme.126 Others, black men in particular, do not live long
enough to collect a fair share of benefits compared to taxes paid.127 Although
workers earn credits for their earnings, and those credits entitle them to ben-
efits, the amount of tax that pays for credits is not uniform. It differs for high
and low-income taxpayers, and has changed over time. The payroll tax rate
has risen, as has the maximum taxable earning base, so there is no uniform
benefit for taxes paid into the system.128 Benefits are not guaranteed or trans-
ferrable. One of the key features of the system, the redistributive nature of
the benefits formula, undermines the market model—high-income workers
and two-earner couples subsidize lower-income workers and single-earner
families.129 These facts illustrate the capricious price of the Social Security
“market.”
The theory of benefits taxation requires taxation of individuals accord-
ing to benefits received. While the current tax system links costs and bene-
fits for groups like families and income cohorts, benefits taxation dictates
that benefits and costs must correspond for individuals as well. Generaliza-
tion across groups undermines the purpose of benefits taxation, which is a
125 See generally C. EUGENE STEUERLE & CALEB QUAKENBUSH, URBAN INST., SOCIAL
SECURITY AND MEDICARE TAXES AND BENEFITS OVER A LIFETIME (2012), available at http://
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412660-Social-Security-and-Medicare-Taxes-and-Benefits-
Over-a-Lifetime.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0SftNL76KMP.
126 Karen Smith et al., Lifetime Distributional Effects of Social Security Retirement Bene-
fits, 65 SOC. SEC. BULL. 33, 34 (2003–04).
127 See id. at 59 tbl.9 (showing largest negative net benefits).
128 See Social Security & Medicare Tax Rates, supra note 26. R
129 See Smith et al., supra note 126. The Social Security system has a variety of redistribu- R
tive features involving high to low earners, younger to older generations, larger to smaller
families, short-lived to longer-lived individuals, unmarried to married individuals, and people
with longer careers to those with shorter careers. See Reforming Social Security Benefits:
Hearing on the President’s and Other Bipartisan Entitlement Reform Proposals Before the H.
Comm. On Ways and Means, 113th Cong. 7 (2013) [hereinafter Steuerle Statement] (State-
ment of C. Eugene Steuerle, Inst. Fellow, Urban Inst., available at http://waysandmeans.house.
gov/uploadedfiles/steuerle_testimony_52313.pdf (last visited October 5, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/0HXU8DUMLP6.
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rejection of redistribution. Consequently, each individual’s benefits must be
determinable and must correspond to taxes paid. This makes some sense
when the benefit is garbage collection, but not when the benefit is retirement
security. Retirement security is too abstract and indeterminate a benefit to be
reduced on these terms; there is no individual connection between tax pay-
ments and benefits received. This is precisely why Social Security is an enti-
tlement—individuals have the right to receive benefits, which is distinct
from the right to receive a particular benefit. Individuals who have paid the
same in payroll taxes can receive different amounts in benefits,130 while
others who receive the same in benefits could have paid different amounts in
taxes.131 All of these aspects of the system distinguish it from a real market
transaction.
Even if the system better resembled a market, the benefits tax model
would still present problems because government benefits are not easily
quantified. Valuation difficulties make benefits taxation an indeterminate
base because the measurement of government benefits is difficult since they
are shared, in-kind, and variable. Without clear allocation of benefits to indi-
viduals, the proper distribution of the tax burden is impossible to specify.
People who have considered benefits taxes generally have argued for very
different applications in practice. Some have suggested that a benefits tax
would be the same as a head tax,132 or that it might look very much like a
progressive income tax.133 In the case of Social Security retirement, the
“price” for benefits must be paid many years prior to the receipt of benefits.
Is the benefit the actual amount of Social Security received over a lifetime,
or is the benefit the security of a steady income until death, regardless of the
actual amount paid out? These valuation problems arise in determining the
right levy for payroll taxes under a benefits tax scheme, and using the tax’s
flat rate as a percentage of wages up to a cap is problematic at best.
Benefits taxation has enjoyed some popularity among libertarians.
Richard Epstein has argued that taxation can only be justified when it creates
a market-like Pareto improvement so that every taxpayer is better off with
the goods and services provided by taxation than with the money paid in
130 Differing lifespans is the most common reason for this. Smith et al., supra note 126, at R
39 (“The main reason OASI hurts retirees in the bottom income quintile is that their life
expectancies are relatively short.”).
131 The benefits formula only considers a subset of all the years that most individuals pay
into the system. See Temporary Regulations on Procedure and Administration under the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, 26 C.F.R. § 404 (2012). Benefits are determined based on 35 years of a
worker’s highest earnings, so workers with more than 35 years of earnings receive no extra
benefits. DAWN NUSCHLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42035, SOCIAL SECURITY PRIMER 7
(2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42035.pdf., archived at http://perma.cc/
08yNX19UjLY.
132 See Walter J. Blum and & Harry Kalven Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxa-
tion, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 452–53 (1952).
133 See Marjorie Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement:
A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 491–97 (1987).
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tax.134 However, benefits taxation has more often been rejected as a just basis
for taxation in the literature.135 John Stuart Mill scorned it as “the reverse of
the true idea of distributive justice.”136 Thus, the payroll tax is not a good
example of a benefits tax, and even if it were, benefits taxation is not a noble
aspiration.
2. Investors Are Virtuous
Another argument for a wage base that excludes capital income is that
savers are virtuous, and should be treated better under the tax law than non-
savers. This argument is generally made in the context of the consumption
tax-income tax debate. Proponents of consumption taxation have described
taxes on capital income as double taxation,137 and discrimination against sav-
ers.138 Edward McCaffery has called taxes on wealth “virtue taxes.”139 The
implication of these value-laden descriptions is that it is a moral imperative
to tax capital income less than labor income. The double taxation and dis-
crimination arguments depend on one’s perspective.140 While many tax pol-
icy experts debate the merits of a consumption tax compared to an income
tax, the debate turns on many contingent factors.141 Apart from this small
interjection, this article will stay out of that morass.
The virtue argument is more recent and more puzzling. It may have
been lurking in the literature all along, but McCaffery has made it explicit.142
It is puzzling because a tax described in terms of “virtue” suggests a moral
distinction on which taxation is based. We do not generally think of taxation
that way, and it is a dangerous development if we start. As Justice Holmes
once said, “taxes are the price we pay for civilized society.”143 Treating taxa-
134 A good system should “insure that every public expenditure is worth more to every
party taxed than the revenues that are lost.” Richard A. Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World,
4 Soc. Phil & Pol’Y, no. 1, 49, 56 (1986). Although Epstein was explicitly arguing for propor-
tional taxation, his argument goes more to tax base than tax rate.
135 See Kornhauser, supra note 133, at 491 n.96. R
136 MILL, supra note 102, at V.2.7. R
137 Id. at V 2.7–2.8.
138 See DAVID BRADFORD, TAXATION, WEALTH AND SAVINGS 30 (2000); DAVID BRAD-
FORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 315 (1986); William Andrews, A Consumption-Type or
Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1167 (1974).
139 Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L. J.
283, 344 (1994) (“The estate tax is quite possibly an anti-sin tax, or, equivalently, a virtue tax.
The estate tax is a tax on work and savings, on thrift, and on altruism.”).
140 See Mark Kelman, Time Preference and Tax Equity, 35 STAN. L. REV. 649, 656 (1983)
(“[D]ifferent accounts of the origin of interest may influence our position on whether ex post
or ex ante treatment of income is ‘appropriate.’”).
141 See, e.g., Barbara Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961
(1992) (debating the merits of different conceptual frameworks for taxes); Alvin Warren,
Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980) [herein-
after Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer] (same).
142 McCaffery, supra note 139, at 343. R
143 Compania Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87,
100 (1927).
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tion as a morality judgment is inconsistent with that approach. Almost eve-
rything that we tax is necessary to keep the economy going. As this article
has described, labor is taxed more heavily than any other factor of produc-
tion, and yet, work is the classic element in Protestant virtue.144 Consumption
is taxed also, and while some people believe consumption to be less virtuous
than savings (if not downright evil), both investment and consumption are
necessary for economic prosperity. A moralistic approach to tax policy that
equates taxation with moral censure is a mistake that threatens to undermine
the civic commitment to tax for the common good. There are good efficiency
reasons to tax costly behaviors, and to subsidize beneficial ones, but it is
important that the arguments are presented solely in terms of efficiency,
rather than fairness.
Tax policy should primarily be about how the government raises the
revenue that it needs to operate. Taxation is too important to survival of the
modern state to be solely the tool of social engineering. It is not a coinci-
dence that advocates of small government are also proponents of taxes on
bad side effects—so-called Pigouvian taxes.145 Pigouvian taxes are designed
to account for negative externalities imposed by taxed activities, such as
pollution and smoking. For people who value efficiency as a social objec-
tive, Pigouvian taxes are normatively desirable because they correct imper-
fect markets to make them more efficient. In that way, they are unlike most
other taxes, which have net efficiency costs, not benefits.146 Nonetheless,
there are very few Pigouvian taxes actually in effect147—even carbon taxes
have little political traction, despite their clear economic benefits. While hu-
morists have suggested taxing all manner of annoyances,148 the universe of
Pigouvian taxes—focusing on the externalities suffered by non-taxpayers—
is limited, and it would be impossible to raise sufficient revenue to fund
government policy if we narrowed the tax base to Pigouvian taxes alone.
Pigouvian taxes are an attractive mechanism for regulation, but cannot sub-
stitute for broad taxation designed according to principles of justice.
144 See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM
(1905).
145 See N. Gregory Mankiw, Smart Taxes: An Open Invitation to Join the Pigou Club, 35
E. ECON. J. 14 (2009).
146 See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 277–95 (5th ed. 1989) (explaining the problem of deadweight loss from taxation).
147 Taxes on cigarettes that account for the harm of second-hand smoke on non-smokers
are an example of a Pigouvian tax, but cigarette taxes that account for damages to smokers are
less clearly Pigouvian. Taxes that increase costs to correct for psychological biases of the
taxpayer are less clearly Pigouvian. See Jeff Strand, Conceptualizing the “Fat Tax”: The Role
of Food Taxes in Developed Economies, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1255–59 (2005).
148 Jasper Reitman, Should We Tax People for Being Annoying?, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY
MAGAZINE, Jan. 8, 2013, at MM15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/maga-
zine/should-we-tax-people-for-being-annoying.html, archived at http://perma.cc/0zuBm2ZD
5Zr (a cartoon showing the taxation of people singing in the shower, playing video games,
keeping a pet, etc.).
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3. Taxes Should Improve Efficiency
Since most taxes have efficiency costs, not efficiency benefits, an argu-
ment to tax for efficiency maximization is really an argument for less taxa-
tion—the most efficient tax is generally none at all. Consequently, the
evaluation of taxes for efficiency is more fruitfully a comparison of relative
costs. Most arguments supporting tax preferences for capital income are effi-
ciency arguments: they concern incentives to save and invest. Taxes on capi-
tal income reduce the after-tax rate of return on capital. In response to the
tax, some people might save less and earn less, while others might save more
to earn more.149 Scholars have argued that the costs of taxing capital income
are too high, and believe that a tax on labor income should raise all the
needed revenue.150 But their argument depends on a value judgment that
eliminating market distortions is more important than other goals—a dubi-
ous proposition for defining just government.
Some ostensible fairness arguments are really efficiency arguments in
disguise—when efficiency is embraced as a normative goal, more efficient
means more just.151 For example, the claim that an income tax discriminates
against savers compared to spenders is really an argument about interest
rates, not distributive justice, because it compares rates of return in a world
with taxes to one in a world without taxes.152 The rate of return in a world
without taxes has no moral significance in the real world, and creates no pre-
social property entitlement to investors.
The “common pool”153 argument that supports taxing only on with-
drawal from investment gives an impression of being about individual fair-
ness for people who benefit others, but it is really about economic growth.
That argument says that amounts invested in the economy benefit everyone,
not just the owner, and that only amounts withdrawn from investment are
really private. Consequently, capital should not be taxed as long as it is en-
149 These are the income and substitution effects, which counteract one another. See LAU-
RIE MALMAN ET AL., THE INDIVIDUAL TAX BASE: CASES, PROBLEMS AND POLICIES IN FEDERAL
TAXATION 10 (2d ed. 2010).
150 See Joseph Bankman & David Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax
Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006) (arguing that a tax on labor income
alone is more efficient and fairer than a tax on both labor and capital income).
151 To some, fairness means promoting growth. See Tax Reform to Encourage Growth,
Reduce the Deficit, and Promote Fairness: Hearing Before the S. Comm on the Budget, 112th
Cong. (2012) (statement of Daniel J. Mitchell, Senior Fellow, Cato Inst.), available at http://
www.cato.org/publications/congressional-testimony/tax-reform-encourage-growth-reduce-defi
cit-promote-fairness, archived at http://perma.cc/0UscSQP2kgJ. Normative arguments for effi-
ciency require justification in terms of political morality. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note
104, at 12. R
152 See Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer, supra note 139. R
153 John Stuart Mill described it as follows: “they abdicate the personal use of their riches;
in proportion as they divert their income from the supply of their own wants, to a productive
investment, through which, instead of being consumed by themselves, it is distributed in wages
among the poor.” MILL, supra note 102, at V.2.22. R
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gaged in production.154 The contemporary notion of private property makes it
difficult to see this communal aspect of investments, particularly given that
investments can foster productivity (or not) anywhere in the world. More
important to rejecting the fairness claims of the common pool is the fact that
a larger total economic pie does not necessarily make everyone’s slice big-
ger.155 The rising tide has definitively not lifted all boats. In addition, con-
sumers—as well as investors—are necessary for economic prosperity. In
fact, too much saving can slow down the economy.156 The recent recession
has proved the importance of demand to economic recovery, so a healthy
supply of capital is not sufficient.157 Spenders and savers are economically
interdependent and essential to one another, and privileging savings has eco-
nomic and distributional costs.
Despite some commentators’ enthusiasm for taxing only labor in-
come—and the tax law’s undeniable shift in that direction—the jury is still
out on the efficiency advantages of taxing only labor income, compared to
taxes on both investment income and labor income.158 Economists have gen-
erally concluded that taxes have little effect on savings behavior.159 A Con-
gressional Research Service report even noted that “[r]elationships between
tax rates and savings appear positively correlated (that is, lower savings are
consistent with lower, not higher, tax rates), although this relationship may
not be causal.”160 In addition, there are some well-known inefficiencies that
weigh against privileging capital income. Current law’s preference for capi-
tal income over labor income encourages taxpayers to convert labor income
154 It is well known that tax deferral is equivalent to yield exemption. See E. Cary Brown,
Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME, EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC
POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN 300, 302–14 (1948). For further explanation,
see generally Christopher Hanna, Demystifying Tax Deferral, 52 SMU L. REV. 383 (1999).
155 Productivity gains in the last decades have gone only to those at the very top. See
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME BETWEEN 1979
AND 2007 10 (2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/
10-25-HouseholdIncome.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/023berB8skm. See generally EM-
MANUEL SAEZ, STRIKING IT RICHER: THE EVOLUTION OF TOP INCOMES IN THE UNITED STATES
(UPDATED WITH 2011 ESTIMATES) (2013), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-US
topincomes-2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0tBG6KZDoBf.
156 See TSUYOSHI OYAMA & KOTARO YOSHIDA, BANK OF JAPAN, DOES JAPAN SAVE TOO
MUCH? OR DO OTHER MAJOR COUNTRIES SAVE TOO LITTLE? INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF
SAVINGS RATES FROM THE MODIFIED GOLDEN RULE APPROACH 4 (1999); International Mone-
tary Fund, Saving Behavior and the Asset Price “Bubble”, in JAPAN: ANALYTICAL STUDIES 5–8
(Ulrich Baumgartner, Guy Meredith & Juha Ka¨hko¨nen eds., 1995).
157 There is currently a glut of capital, as U.S. companies hoard cash and borrow at histori-
cally low rates. Apple recently borrowed $17 billion, even though it has $145 billion in cash.
See, e.g., Peter Lattman & Peter Eavis, To Satisfy Its Investors, Cash-Rich Apple Borrows
Money, NY TIMES, May 1, 2013, at B1, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/30/
apple-raises-17-billion-in-record-debt-sale, archived at http://perma.cc/0aWf8k6MgPz.
158 Compare Joseph Bankman & David Weisbach, supra note 150, with Chris Sanchirico, R
A Critical Look at the Economic Argument for Taxing Only Labor Income, 63 TAX L. REV. 867
(2010).
159 JANE GRAVELLE & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42111, TAX RATES
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, 7 (2011) (reviewing literature on the topic).
160 Id. at summary.
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into capital income.161 It discourages investment in people, compared to in-
vestment in equipment. The higher individual rate of tax on individual com-
pensation encourages what Professor Edward Kleinbard has called “labor
stuffing,” which disguises labor earnings as capital income.162
Instead of engaging in a debate about economics, which has largely
defined the terms of discussion about taxing labor and capital (even when
argued by lawyers), lawyers should consider the proper context for effi-
ciency in analyzing tax policy. Particularly where economists have con-
cluded that efficiency differences among alternatives are small,163 important
tax policy questions should be judged for fairness rather than efficiency. The
tax law is a very powerful tool for distributive justice, and almost always a
source of inefficiency in the market, so in evaluating tax policies where effi-
ciency differences among alternatives are small, we should be more con-
cerned about fairness than efficiency.164
4. It Is Hard To Tax Capital Income And Easy To Tax Labor
Income
Ease of collection may be the most compelling reason for taxing wages
heavily, but it is a bad reason nonetheless. Capital income is hard to tax and
labor income is easy to tax. The payroll tax is a paragon of administrative
simplicity. Government has a collection agent in employers: they are re-
quired to collect the tax and remit it on behalf of employees. Withholding
means that employees never get the opportunity to hide their earnings, so
they cannot evade the payroll tax.165 The people actually paying the tax are
161 This is a problem that proponents of consumption taxation have faced. The exemption
of returns to capital encourages taxpayers to disguise labor income as capital income. See
DAVID BRADFORD, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 117 (2d ed. 1984) (requiring that
owners of small businesses include amounts on cash-flow basis in a consumption tax to ensure
that labor not be subsumed within capital and free of tax). The same problem arises whenever
labor income is more heavily taxed than capital income.
162 Where labor income is taxed more heavily than capital income, business owners have
an incentive to transform their labor income into capital income by characterizing returns to
work in the business as returns to capital invested in that business. The strategy reduces the tax
collected on the income. This is particularly problematic when tax rates on individual labor
income are substantially higher than tax rates on corporations. See generally Edward D.
Kleinbard, Corporate Capital and Labor Stuffing in the New Tax Rate Environment (Univ. S.
Cal. Ctr. L. & Soc. Sci. Research Paper No. C13-5, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2239360.
163 See GRAVELLE & MARPLES, supra note 159, at summary (“A review of statistical evi- R
dence suggests that both labor supply and savings and investment are relatively insensitive to
tax rates.”).
164 I have critiqued the centrality of efficiency in tax policy. See generally Linda Sugin,
Tax Expenditures, Reform and Distributive Justice, 3 COL. J. TAX L. 1, 35–39 (2012); Linda
Sugin, The Great and Mighty Tax Law: How the Roberts Court Has Reduced Constitutional
Scrutiny for Taxes and Tax Expenditures, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 777 (2013).
165 Employees need the cooperation of their employers to evade payroll taxes, who must
be willing to pay them “off the books” and incur the risks that accompany it. Employers who
fail to collect payroll taxes and remit them to the government are liable for substantial penal-
ties, sometimes including criminal liability. Examples of Employment Tax Fraud Investigations
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not directly involved in the transaction at all. Unlike the income tax, there is
no pretense that payroll taxes are part of a self-reporting system. All this
means that it may be too easy to tax wages, and consequently, revenue pres-
sures may have made taxes on labor income irresistible.
From a collection perspective, income taxes on wages are only slightly
more cumbersome than payroll taxes. Employers also withhold income taxes
on wages, and there is rarely a difficult calculation about how much an em-
ployee’s wages are. Employees can deduct and credit various things from
their income for income tax calculation, but every dollar of wage is included
in taxable income, and taxpayers do not need to figure how much that is
because employers report it on their form W-2s. There is virtually no gap
between tax collections and tax liability for employee wages. However, the
tax gap is large for individuals who work for themselves and consequently
self-report their labor income.166 While self-employment income is theoreti-
cally taxed in the same way as wage income of employees, in practice, it is
often taxed less. People who work for themselves can understate their labor
income by failing to report a portion of earnings, and can also mischaracter-
ize labor income as income from capital in order to pay lower rates of tax on
it.167 In addition, there are questionable legal strategies used by high-income
people to minimize their self-employment tax liability, which is the counter-
part to employee payroll taxes.168
Compared to employee wages and even self-employment labor income,
income from capital is infinitely harder to determine and considerably easier
for taxpayers to minimize or hide. Capital income taxation relies on taxpay-
ers to keep records, and self-report accurately and honestly. William An-
drews’ preference for a consumption tax over an income tax was based
largely on his view that an accurate income tax would be too difficult to
design and administer. He argued that the accretion component of income is
- Fiscal Year 2012, INTERNAL REV. SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/Examples-of-Employment-
Tax-Fraud-Investigations-Fiscal-Year-2012 (last updated Sept. 17, 2013), archived at http://
perma.cc/0oyNuwcSRAf.
166 A recent IRS study estimates the annual tax gap to be roughly 15% of the total taxes
owed (between $257 and $298 billion dollars. The bulk of the tax gap comes from individuals
failing to report business activity income, and not wages. Wage earners, as a subset of taxpay-
ers, have an estimated tax gap of only 1.5%. New IRS Study Provides Preliminary Tax Gap
Estimate, INTERNAL REV. SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/New-IRS-Study-Provides-Preliminary
-Tax-Gap-Estimate (last updated March 29, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/0RaZTW
nKTNm. See generally INTERNAL REV. SERV., TAX GAP FACTS AND FIGURES (2012), available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/tax_gap_facts-figures.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0S7T
9UUip7b.
167 The self-employment tax covers a slightly different base than the payroll tax, so that it
taxes some income from capital, but not all income from labor. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
THE TAXATION OF CAPITAL AND LABOR THROUGH THE SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX v (2012),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/09-27-SECA.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/0tos28VEYmU.
168 Presidential candidates John Edwards and Newt Gingrich both used S corporations to
evade SECA tax on their labor earnings. See Cherie J. Hennig, Blaise M. Sonnier, William A.
Raabe, & John O. Everett, S Corp Taxation: Level the Playing Field, 139 TAX NOTES 435, 436
(2013).
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too challenging for practical taxation, particularly if we try to accommodate
inflation, interest rate changes, and human capital.169
In the current income tax system, where capital income is theoretically
included in the tax base, its actual inclusion often depends on taxpayer ac-
quiescence. As discussed above, the realization rule makes a current tax on
gains voluntary—taxpayers can decide not to sell assets if they want to defer
tax. They can even get cash without paying tax: it is perfectly legal to bor-
row against one’s assets without current tax, even if that borrowing allows
current consumption to be financed with untaxed funds.170 Another simple
and legal strategy for taxpayers with capital is offshore investment. Taxpay-
ers with assets and income overseas can leave their earnings offshore and
defer the tax on them.171 Better advised taxpayers can engage in more com-
plex tax planning, but there are plenty of simple strategies available to avoid
current tax on investments because current law is generous to capital
holders.
Sometimes avoiding tax on investments is not legal, but easy to accom-
plish for taxpayers with investment income. Taxpayers have historically self-
reported their basis in assets inaccurately.172 An overstatement of basis pro-
duces an understatement of income, and until financial institutions start re-
porting investment basis to the government, taxpayers can inflate their bases
for determining gain on investment with little recourse for the govern-
ment.173 Jurisdictions with bank secrecy rules have historically made it easy
for taxpayers to hide their earnings from the authorities.174 New legal rules
169 William Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1113, 1143–46 (1974).
170 See Edward McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 892–93
(2005) (“buy, borrow, die”).
171 For an overview of how United States taxes income earned abroad, see JOINT COMM.
TAXATION STAFF, 112th CONG., BACKGROUND AND SELECTED ISSUES RELATED TO THE U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM AND SYSTEMS THAT EXEMPT FOREIGN BUSINESS INCOME 2–7
(2011), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3793 (“For-
eign business income earned by a domestic parent corporation indirectly through a foreign
corporate subsidiary generally is not subject to U.S. tax until the income is distributed as a
dividend to the domestic corporation.”).
172 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-603, CAPITAL GAINS TAX GAP: RE-
QUIRING BROKERS TO REPORT SECURITIES COST BASIS WOULD IMPROVE COMPLIANCE IF RE-
LATED CHALLENGES ARE ADDRESSED, 1 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/
250426.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0wjkdArNq9K.
173 New requirements under I.R.C. § 6045(g) (Supp. III, 2009), adopted in the Energy
Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 §403, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765, requires
basis reporting, but the effective date has been postponed to 2014. See I.R.S. Notice 2012-34,
2012-21 I.R.B. 937. Regulations implementing the requirements were recently adopted. See
Basis Reporting by Securities Brokers and Basis Determination for Debt Instruments and Op-
tions; Reporting for Premium, 78 Fed. Reg. 23, 116 (Apr. 18, 2013) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pt. 1, 602). See generally JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34216, TAX
GAP: PROPOSALS IN THE 110TH CONGRESS REQUIRE BROKERS TO REPORT BASIS ON TRADED
SECURITIES (2008), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34216_20081008.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/0pVvp5MMLoG.
174 Some progress has recently been made to relax these rules for tax administration. See
Andrew Higgins, Europe Pushes to Shed Stigma of a Tax Haven, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2013,
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crack down on overseas investments,175 but tax havens are still in the busi-
ness of helping taxpayers shelter their income from the IRS.176
One goal of good tax policymaking is administrative effectiveness.
Ease of administration and costs of collection are part of the efficiency anal-
ysis of taxation, though not its central concern in the tax policy literature.
Efficiency analysis is primarily about the behavioral distortions produced by
taxation—how taxes on savings discourage investment, for example. These
issues are extensively analyzed and debated in the scholarly literature, but
administrative convenience is mostly taken for granted in a way that elevates
it in practical application.177 If we had to justify taxing wages on the ground
that they are easy to tax, we might see what a bad argument convenience
really is. But the administrative ease of taxing workers—for the government
and the ultimate taxpayers—may best explain why taxes on wages collected
by employers are so universal.178
D. Taxing Capital Income As Much As Labor Income Promotes Justice
In the last section, I analyzed some of the arguments in favor of the
current system. While the arguments are plausible explanations for a sepa-
rate payroll tax, and for taxing labor income more than capital income, they
ultimately fail to justify the distribution of tax burdens in current law’s com-
bination of payroll taxation and income taxation. This section focuses more
specifically on fairness arguments. It considers the distinguishing character-
istics of labor income and capital income in order to evaluate whether one
should be more heavily taxed than the other on fairness grounds. I start by
noting that income is a tax base replete with equity concerns.179 One fairness
argument regarding income taxation is that every dollar of income should be
taxed once, and only once, so an income tax is inconsistent with taxing some
sources of income multiple times and other sources of income less than
once. In addition, there are timing differences in earnings and consumption,
and capital income requires that a taxpayer wait to consume. Tax scholars
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/world/europe/europe-pushes-to-shed-
stigma-of-tax-haven-with-end-to-bank-secrecy.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/0Xq8
KAQ65s1.
175 See Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), I.R.C. §§ 1471–1474 (Supp. V
2011) adopted as part of The Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71.
176 See Melissa Costa & Jennifer Gravelle, Taxing Multinational Corporations: Average
Tax Rates, 65 TAX L. REV. 391, 399 (2012) (average tax rates of U.S. controlled foreign corpo-
rations in tax havens vary from 1.9% to 9.2%).
177 Tax literature for a more public audience considers these issues in depth. See JOEL
SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER
TAXES 157–188 (3rd ed. 2004).
178 All OECD countries have wage taxes. See Taxing Wages 2013, OECD, http://www.
oecd.org/ctp/tax-policy/taxing-wages.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2013), archived at http://perma.
cc/06SdsqSWkny.
179 A full defense of an income tax base is beyond the scope of this article.
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reflexively treat present values as equivalent for all purposes, but I argue that
present value is not a normative concept, so that fairness for individual tax-
payers does not demand that equal present values be taxed the same. Finally,
labor income and capital income involve individuals differently. Because
labor income requires work, it exemplifies individual autonomous choice
and demands unique non-substitutable investment of the person. This ulti-
mate reason may be the most important for my conclusion that fairness de-
mands that capital income be taxed (at least) as heavily as labor income.
1. Income Is a Normatively Attractive Tax Base
The federal income tax was enacted in 1913, after the Constitution was
amended to specifically authorize it.180 Even prior to the adoption of the
sixteenth amendment, Congress’ power to tax was substantial,181 and the
government had ample capability to raise revenue. Nevertheless, the federal
power to tax income was considered sufficiently important to national policy
to warrant constitutional amendment. The income tax was originally adopted
because it was considered “the most ‘equitable’ form of taxation.”182 In the
Congressional debates that led to the adoption of the ill-fated 1894 income
tax, legislators “recognized the injustice of imposing the full cost of govern-
ment on those of limited means—farmers and workers—through the regres-
sive system of protective tariffs and excises while largely exempting capital
from taxation.”183 Today’s statute follows that approach, by prohibiting
source distinctions for income,184 and thereby making the difference between
labor income and capital income irrelevant. The section lists examples of
what is included in the definition of “gross income,” and it specifically men-
tions both income from labor185 and income from capital.186
The normative reasons for adopting an income tax remain compelling
today: income is a desirable tax base because it allocates tax burdens based
on ability to pay and demands equal sacrifice from everyone.187 Proponents
of income taxation today, including this author, generally believe that an
income tax is the most realistic way to tax the rich more than the poor,
something a fair tax system must do.188 In an income tax, those with greater
abilities to pay tax are called on to contribute more to the collective welfare
180 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
181 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
182 Sheldon Pollack, Origins of the Modern Income Tax, 1894–1913, 66 TAX LAW. 295,
295 (2013) (“Not only did many Republicans approve these new tax policies, the arguments
they advanced in support of the income tax were commonly framed in terms of ‘equity,’ ‘jus-
tice,’ and ‘fairness.’”).
183 Id. at 304.
184 Income includes “all income from whatever source derived” according to I.R.C.
§ 61(a)(1) (2006).
185 Id.
186 IRC §§ 61(a) (2006).
187 See Allen Gunn, The Case for An Income Tax, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 370, 385 (1978–79).
188 See Calvin Johnson, We Don’t Need No Stinkin’ VAT, 139 TAX NOTES 527, 529 (2013).
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than those with lesser abilities to pay tax. Because the marginal value of
money declines as an individual’s resources grow, the burden of taxation is
equitably distributed when the rich pay more dollars; everyone feels an equal
degree of pain from taxation.189 The income base reflects the notion that “it
is the taxpayer’s claim to resources . . . that best measures his ability to bear
tax.”190 It reflects the principle that people should contribute to the common
good according to how much they have, and considers accumulation in in-
vestments part of a taxpayer’s ability to contribute to the common good.191
“Levying the tax on income is . . . simply a logical concomitant of the
proposition that society in general has a claim on its annual product that is
prior to the claims of its individual citizens.”192 An income tax also maxi-
mizes the opportunity for self-realization and democratic participation, com-
pared to alternative tax bases.193 Resources include all sources of income; a
tax on labor income alone would allow those with greater resources from
non-labor sources to bear a lesser overall burden.
Income might not be the only measure of ability to pay tax. Some have
argued that endowments are the best measure of ability to pay tax,194 and
others have suggested that wealth is a superior measure.195 While wealth,
rather than income, might be a better measure of ability to pay,196 the drafters
of the income tax and the adopters of the sixteenth amendment were not
crazy in thinking that an income tax better reflected Adam Smith and John
Stuart Mill’s maxims of fair taxation than what they replaced, a system pri-
marily composed of excises and tariffs.197 Income is a reasonable measure of
ability to pay because it reflects economic resources that benefits a person
189 John Stuart Mill explained: “As a government ought to make no distinction of persons
or classes in the strength of their claims on it, whatever sacrifices it requires from them should
be made to bear as nearly as possible with the same pressure upon all, which, it must be
observed, is the mode by which least sacrifice is occasioned on the whole.” MILL, supra note
102, at V. 2.6. R
190 Calvin Johnson, Measure Tax Expenditures by Internal Rate of Return, 139 TAX NOTES
273, 286 (2013).
191 See Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV.
423, 463 (2000).
192 See Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer, supra note 141, at 1090. A review of R
the justifications for an income tax are beyond the scope of this article, but there is a rich
literature on it.
193 James Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 1129, 1132, 1154 (2008).
194 See Daniel Shaviro, Endowment and Inequality, in TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DE-
BATE 123 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002). I am critical of the endow-
ment tax ideal. See Sugin, Philosophical Objection, supra note 106. R
195 An income tax does tax wealth. See Noel Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income
and the Choice of Tax Base, 52 Tax L. Rev. 17, 19–20 (1996).
196 See Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer, supra note 141, at 1122; Schenk, R
supra note 191, at 463–66. R
197 See generally CARL DAVIS ET AL., THE INSTITUTE ON TAXATION & ECONOMIC POLICY,
WHO PAYS? A DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE TAX SYSTEMS IN ALL 50 STATES (4th ed.
2013) available at http://www.itep.org/pdf/whopaysreport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
0gZx3LX1cg6.
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and over which he has control.198 The architects of the income tax system
treated command over acquired resources—from any source—as the appro-
priate measure of taxation. They were not mistaken to do so.199
2. Labor Income is Doubly Taxed
Our federal tax system does not just tax labor income, it taxes it twice,
once under the payroll tax and again under the income tax. Although in-
comes exceeding the statutory cap are not taxed under the payroll tax, every
dollar taxed under the payroll tax is also included in gross income for pur-
poses of calculating income tax. The double-tax argument is an intuitive
feature of tax policy discussions, along with the assumption that a double tax
is unjust. Nevertheless, there is not anything intrinsically meaningful in
whether a dollar is taxed once or twice—the same dollar is often taxed mul-
tiple times by different governments or to different taxpayers. What is im-
portant is the overall burden that the government imposes on individuals,
and a double tax by a single tax collector is important if it indicates that a
person is being taxed too heavily overall. Identifying the double tax on labor
income is important because people treat the payroll tax as an insurance
contribution, and consequently fail to include it as part of the total tax
burden.
The double tax allegation has proved powerful. In debating possible
repeal of the estate tax, people argued that the estate tax is unfair because it
is a double tax on income previously taxed under the income tax.200 The
double tax argument is peculiar with respect to the estate tax since much of
the estate tax base consists of untaxed appreciation under the income tax;201
built-in gains at the time of death are permanently exempt from income taxa-
tion because the decedent’s heirs receive the asset with a date of death basis
for income tax purposes. Those gains are never taxed to anyone under the
income tax. Consequently, the estate tax is an alternative to the income tax
for a substantial amount of income—whenever an asset is taxed under the
estate tax, but stepped up in basis under the income tax, the gain reflected in
the step-up is taxed only in the estate tax.
198 This is also the Supreme Court’s definition of income. Commissioner v. Glenshaw
Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 477 (1955) (“Here we have instances of undeniable accessions to wealth,
clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.”).
199 Debates about other bases are beyond the scope of this article because this article
focuses on the narrower question of whether different sources of income should be taxed
differently in a just system. Whether different uses of income should be subject to differential
taxation is an independent question.
200 See 160 CONG. REC. H4084 (daily ed. June 8, 2000) (statement of Rep. Dreier).
201 In 2000, 36% of taxable estates were unrealized capital gains. The ratio of unrealized
capital gains increased as the size of the estate increased. For estates exceeding $10 million an
average of 56% of the estate was unrealized capital gains. James M. Poterba & Scott Weisben-
ner, The Distributional Burden Of Taxing Estates And Unrealized Capital Gains At The Time
Of Death 18–19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7811, 2000).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\51-1\HLL104.txt unknown Seq: 37 30-JAN-14 8:28
2014] Payroll Taxes, Mythology, and Fairness 149
Similarly, some claim that a tax on investment returns is a double tax
on the invested capital,202 even though there are different dollars—the in-
vested amount and the return—to which the tax applies. The argument is that
the after-tax rate of return on an investment is reduced by tax imposed on
that return, and gives the taxpayer the arithmetic equivalence of a greater tax
on the corpus (and no tax on the return). While the arithmetic works, the
unstated assumption is that present value is important for fairness. But that
case has not been made.
Finally, some argue that investment returns should be taxed less or un-
taxed to individual investors because those dollars have already been taxed
to the investors under the corporate tax. The data simply do not support this
argument. First, corporate tax collections are low, and while the statutory
rate is 35% for large corporations, the effective rate of tax that corporations
pay is substantially lower than the 39.6% top rate on labor income, so even
if all corporate income were taxed, it would be subject to a lesser burden
than labor income. Second, economists disagree about whether capital hold-
ers even bear the burden of the corporate tax.203 Some claim that labor really
bears the tax,204 which, if true, makes it even more troubling that our system
explicitly taxes workers so heavily. If workers implicitly pay the corporate
tax, then the fairness claim for increasing taxes on individual holders of
capital becomes even stronger.
3. Present Value Is Not a Normative Concept
The financial concept of present value is crucial in tax policy. Present
value allows us to compare dollars from different moments in time. I can
202 See MILL, supra note 102, at V. 2.22 (“[A]s the savings pay at any rate the full tax as R
soon as they are invested, their exemption from payment in the earlier stage is necessary to
prevent them from paying twice, while money spent in unproductive consumption pays only
once . . . .”).
203 See generally Kimberly Clausing, Who Pays The Corporate Tax In A Global Economy,
66 Nat’l Tax J. 151 (2013). That volume includes other articles discussing this issue. See also
Mirrlees Review, INST. FOR FISCAL STUD., available at http://www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesReview
(last visited Oct. 25, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/0oE1mp4dgwx.
204 The argument stems from the relative mobility of capital and labor, and there is no
consensus among economists. It is possible that capital competes worldwide, making it impos-
sible for the U.S. to prevent companies from shifting the costs of a tax from its owners to its
workers, who are less able to relocate to minimize tax. See generally Mihir Desai, A Better
Way to Tax U.S. Businesses, HARV. BUS. REV. (July-Aug 2012) (advocating the labor-burden
view), available at http://hbr.org/2012/07/a-better-way-to-tax-us-businesses/ar/1, archived at
perma.cc/0CPnXBF5oG9. For a full explanation of the issue and how it might affect the
progressivity of the tax, see generally BENJAMIN HARRIS, TAX POL’Y CTR., CORPORATE TAX
INCIDENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRESSIVITY (2009), available at http://www.taxpoli-
cycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001349_corporate_tax_incidence.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/0Mekb6jJeVH. In its distribution tables, the Tax Policy Center assumes that the corporate
tax is borne 60% by shareholders, 20% by all capital holders and 20% by labor. Prior to
September 2012, it assumed that the entire incidence was on capital holders. See Urban Inst. &
Brookings Inst., TPC’s Microsimulation Model FAQ, TAX POL’Y CTR., http://www.taxpoli-
cycenter.org/taxtopics/Model-FAQ-2013.cfm#q9 (last visited Oct. 23, 2013), archived at http:/
/perma.cc/0wzxUWaQNk2.
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pay tax today or tomorrow, and if the government charges me interest for
paying later, the timing of the liability should not matter. If prevailing inter-
est rates are 10% (and there is no inflation), a dollar today becomes $1.10 a
year from now. One dollar today is the present value of $1.10 next year.
What, if anything, does that imply about fair taxation?
Scholars generally assume that equivalent present values are the same,
but equivalent is not the same. The present value of a dollar is not really the
same thing as the dollar itself, even though we conventionally treat them as
economically equivalent. It is reasonable to use the concept of present value
to compare prices, but the concept of present value is financial, not norma-
tive. Present value is about accounting, not justice. Accepting a normative
imperative from present value concepts demands that normal returns to in-
vestment be exempt from tax. That means that a dollar after-tax today should
be $1.10 after-tax a year from now. But why imbue a financial concept with
normative force? Utilitarians have argued that the return is not a real accre-
tion to wealth because it is offset by the loss of welfare involved in wait-
ing.205 By exempting the return to capital, the tax system compensates the
taxpayer for his pain from waiting—exclusion operates like a deduction that
offsets the money income. This is not an uncontested fact. Mark Kelman’s
analysis of the utility of individuals who consume at different times suggests
that the implied deduction might not be appropriate from a utilitarian
perspective.206
Even if there is pain in waiting that the tax system should acknowledge,
it cannot explain why labor income is taxed more heavily than capital in-
come. If the tax system accounts for the pain in waiting inherent in capital
income, it should also account for the pain in producing labor income. There
is real pain in working, and a tax system that accurately measures various
sources of disutility in income production might well treat the pain of work-
ing as deserving a bigger tax discount than the pain in waiting.
4. Labor Income Reflects Personal Agency
Equality demands that government “design[ ] institutions that guaran-
tee equal concern and respect for everyone.”207 Part of guaranteeing equal
concern and respect is allowing each person “to develop her own conception
of a meaningful life.”208 Work is an integral aspect of an individual’s self-
conception, and an important component in creating a meaningful life. Peo-
ple are emotionally connected to their work and their chosen occupation is
important in defining who they are. This is why work is so important to
fairness and why a particular respect for work should inform the design of
205 See Mark Kelman, supra note 140, at 653. R
206 Id.
207 Sugin, Philosophical Objection, supra note 106, at 239. R
208 Id. This conception of the role of government is a liberal-egalitarian one.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\51-1\HLL104.txt unknown Seq: 39 30-JAN-14 8:28
2014] Payroll Taxes, Mythology, and Fairness 151
the tax base. A just government taxes in a way that allows individual devel-
opment and personal expression through work. The tax system must ac-
knowledge the special role of labor in contributing to personal autonomy,
and must guarantee that individuals receive the fruits of their labor to the
extent necessary to make their work (and life more generally) meaningful.
There is substantial room for taxing wages within this framework. Jus-
tice creates outer limits for taxation, but allows a broad variety of tax bases
and rates,209 and I would not argue that our current system is beyond the
limits of justice.210 Nevertheless, the creation of human capital—and the in-
vestment of the self that such creation requires—is one of the most funda-
mental means to personal development and fulfillment. Justice demands that
policymakers acknowledge the importance of work to individual agency, and
take care not to levy too heavy a relative burden on it. Ronald Dworkin
explicitly advocated an income tax in his central treatment of economic jus-
tice because he believed that an income tax is able to “neutralize the effects
of differential talents, yet preserve the consequences of one person choosing
an occupation, in response to his sense of what he wants to do with his life
. . . .”211
While human capital is crucial for individual autonomy, financial capi-
tal is not. Human capital is inherently limited, while financial capital is po-
tentially unlimited. Consequently, individuals choosing to engage their
human capital in a particular way foreclose other options for it. Financial
capital, on the other hand, can be amassed and diversified, allowing individ-
uals to invest in an infinite number of projects. The just limits on capital
taxation do not come from protecting autonomy, but from maximizing the
capacity of capital to increase social welfare; too heavy a burden on capital
could potentially contract the economy to the detriment of individual wel-
fare. Furthermore, a person with financial capital can produce returns despite
being ill, disabled, weak or frail, while human capital income is more frag-
ile, requiring continuing attention and effort. Investment of human capital is
active, while financial capital can be invested passively. Human capital may
be engaged in autonomously important ways that do not produce financial
returns at all; an individual’s pursuit of a meaningful life might not produce
any money income. The distinction between human capital and financial
capital is the difference between time and money. Because people have only
a single life to make meaningful, time is crucial. The concept of desert is
important in creating a hierarchy of just taxes, and individuals deserve more
of the fruits of their labor than the fruits of their capital because they have
invested more of themselves in it; taxing a person’s financial capital is a
lesser imposition on him as a person compared to taxing his human capital.
209 See generally Sugin, Limitations, supra note 105. R
210 Justice in the tax system depends substantially on factors outside the tax system, such
as government spending and institutions for equality. Id. at 2005.
211 RONALD DWORKIN, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 283, 313 (1981).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\51-1\HLL104.txt unknown Seq: 40 30-JAN-14 8:28
152 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 51
If taxation is used as a mechanism to divide joint returns between individu-
als and society, the investment that individuals make in their labor income is
more personal and costly to them than the investment they make in their
capital income. The personal effort required for working is unique, so the
returns to work are more closely related to personhood than the returns to
capital.
The classic libertarian claim that taxes are akin to slavery212 is consis-
tent with the more autonomy-focused approach in articulating an objection
that particularly applies to the taxation of labor income. Robert Nozick
wrote: “Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced la-
bor . . . . taking the earnings of n hours labor is like taking n hours from the
person.”213 Although libertarians generally oppose taxes on any income, in-
cluding capital income, arguments based on personal freedom have signifi-
cantly more resonance as applied to labor income than capital income.
Nozick’s own opposition to taxation on income from capital is derivative of
his view about labor earnings.214 So, whether one values institutional re-
spect—as liberal egalitarians do, or freedom—as libertarians do, labor in-
come has a uniquely important role.
III. THE MOST UNFAIR TAX
This article has argued that the current system—with its combination of
payroll taxes on wages and higher income taxes on labor income compared
to capital income—creates both horizontal and vertical inequity. The overall
effect is unfair to people who work. Nevertheless, expiration of the payroll
tax holiday at the end of 2012 produced mostly a yawn. Why? This section
argues that a mythology surrounding payroll taxation—based loosely on its
connection to Social Security retirement—has made wage earners compla-
cent about the outsize tax burdens imposed on them. Given the design and
the rhetoric of the payroll tax/retirement benefit scheme, it is not surprising
that people fail to see the inequity in the system. We call the system insur-
ance, so it is reasonable if people think it is like other kinds of insurance.
Our payroll taxes go into a dedicated fund to pay out retirement benefits, so
it is reasonable if people think it is like private retirement savings. There is a
“trust fund,” so it is reasonable for people to believe payroll taxes are held
in trust. The payroll tax/retirement benefit system fits poorly into these para-
digms, but they are the best explanation for why payroll taxes have remained
largely below the radar of tax fairness debate. This section deconstructs the
payroll tax mythology. The next section challenges that mythology by argu-
ing that retirement security should be funded the same way as defense,
homeland security and education—by fair taxes.
212 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 169 (1974).
213 Id.
214 Id. at 171–72.
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A. The “Trust Fund” Is Not a “Fund”
While most payroll tax collections are paid out immediately to eligible
recipients, some are not. For many years, more payroll tax was collected
from workers than was needed to fund benefits for current retirees, creating
an excess amount. The system’s creators had to devise a mechanism to ac-
commodate these timing mismatches. The “trust fund” is that mechanism,
and it was designed to accommodate temporary surplus, while ensuring
“that social security would remain largely immune from political and fiscal
pressures.”215 When Al Gore was running for President in 2000, he promised
to put the Social Security trust funds into a “lockbox” to prevent them from
being diverted to other uses.216 This comment perpetuated the notion that the
trust funds contain a pile of cash that could be locked up.217 But it is an
imprecise interpretation of the law, which requires that trust funds be in-
vested in U.S. government securities.218
The trust fund is not a pot of gold; it is an accounting measure.219 It
contains no cash. It has “no economic meaning.”220 Instead, the trust fund
consists of government obligations. The trust fund invests in Treasury securi-
ties, which means that the Social Security system loans the money it does
not currently need to the rest of the federal government.221 The government
uses that money for other purposes—like wars and infrastructure—and
promises that it will pay Social Security recipients for it later (with interest).
So, the trust fund is just the federal government borrowing from itself.222 As
such, it is an unfunded obligation to pay in the future, an accounting entry
that will have to be covered with cash to be raised at another time. The
federal government owing money to itself means that it will collect the funds
to pay for some current outlays later. It is possible—though unlikely—that
215 Burke & McCouch, supra note 113, at 1213. R
216 In an interview with Tim Russert, he said, “I want to put Social Security and Medicare
in an iron-clad lockbox with a sign that says, ‘politicians, hands off.’” Text: Tim Russert’s
Interview with Vice President Gore, WASH. POST (July 16, 2000), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-srv/onpolitics/elections/goretext071600.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/0yrGte9MK
jw.
217 It also provided a gold mine for comedians. See First Presidential Debate, SATURDAY
NIGHT LIVE TRANSCRIPTS, http://snltranscripts.jt.org/00/00adebate.phtml (last visited Oct. 25,
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/0fPyXzXBSTS.
218 42 U.S.C. § 401 (2006).
219 See NUSCHLER, supra note 131, at 3. R
220 Martin Feldstein, The Case for Privatization, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 24, 27 (1997).
221 See Neil Buchanan, Social Security And Government Deficits: When Should We
Worry?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 257, 273 (2007) (“To say that the Trust Funds are invested in
Treasury securities means simply that the Social Security system’s surpluses have allowed the
federal government to borrow less money from private parties than it otherwise would have in
the absence of the Trust Funds.”).
222 It is a big borrower. The federal government itself holds more than 40% of total federal
debt, and the trust funds are the government’s biggest creditors. See Federal Debt Basics, U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/longterm/debt/debtbasics.
html (last visited Oct. 25, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/0XmsNAL74Fy.
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the federal government will default on its obligations to the trust fund.223 If it
does not default, the money to pay back the funds borrowed from the trust
fund will have to come from someplace, and the most likely place is general
revenues. So, as the trust fund is drawn down, general revenues will finance
Social Security payments; income tax payments will then fund Social
Security.
B. Payroll Taxes Are Not Insurance Premiums
The payroll tax is technically called the Federal Insurance Contributions
Act—FICA. Despite the label, the payroll tax is fundamentally unlike an
insurance premium or contribution. There is a connection between payroll
taxes and Social Security benefits, but that connection does not resemble the
premium/payout model of insurance. Insurance is about spreading risk. It is
a communal instrument in which subscribers pay a small amount to protect
against the risk of a large loss. I insure against the possibility that my house
will burn down—even though the probability of my house actually burning
down is small—because if my house did burn down, it would be cata-
strophic for me. Insurance requires many homeowners willing to pay modest
premiums to cover the large loss that a few of them ultimately suffer. Insur-
ance is designed so that everyone who buys insurance has a risk of loss, but
only a few policyholders actually suffer the loss. Insurance companies make
profits because homeowners are willing to pay higher premiums than the
expected value of their losses.224 If everyone’s house burned down, the sys-
tem would collapse. Similarly, people buy life insurance because they are
afraid that their children would be without support in case of their death.
Young, healthy people pay lower premiums than older, sicker people be-
cause their risk of death in any year is small. But like the house fire, a young
parent’s untimely death would be catastrophic for his family. People buy life
insurance to pool the risk that they might die and be unable to provide for
their families. If everyone died young and collected on their life insurance,
the system would go bankrupt; it is because most policyholders don’t die that
the insurance works.
The payroll tax is unlike an insurance premium because it is not paid
for pooling catastrophic—but unlikely—risk. Against the paradigms of
homeowners insurance and life insurance, what are the risks that payroll
taxpayers are insuring against? The two (somewhat connected) possibilities
223 The federal government’s creditors include a wide variety of individuals and institu-
tions. Until recently, it was inconceivable that the United States would default, but Congres-
sional brinkmanship over the federal debt ceiling raised the possibility that the government
would be unable to pay some of its debts as they came due.
224 Insurance companies have two sources of profits—the float on premiums in addition to
the premium income itself. See Tim Worstall, What Warren Buffett’s Results Tell Us About
Obamacare, FORBES (Feb. 26, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/02/26/
what-warren-buffetts-results-tell-us-about-obamacare/, archived at http://perma.cc/0SuN3qLw
hwj.
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are the risk of poverty in old age, and the risk of living too long. By charac-
terizing the benefit in these terms, the tax is a payment to reduce risk and
provide peace of mind, just like real insurance. For many individuals, payroll
taxes are a cost with a negative expected value, just like real insurance, be-
cause premiums paid can be actuarially determined to exceed the expected
benefits to be received.225 Social security provides comfort to people who
worry they may be unable to support themselves by working in their old age.
But the resemblance to real insurance ends there because most people
anticipate being unable to work in their old age. Compared to real insurance
contracts, the most obvious flaw in treating payroll taxes as insurance is that
too many people collect. Insurance markets work only because the
probability of a payout is small for each insured individual. But the
probability of payout under Social Security is very high. Most people can
expect to collect Social Security, while (fortunately) most cannot expect to
collect on their fire insurance or their life insurance.226 Lifetime payroll taxes
need to be high because the Social Security system pays out huge sums. In
2012, 57 million people received Social Security benefits of $786 billion.227
There were more Social Security recipients than the entire U.S. population
of people over 65 years old.228 The prospect of collecting on the “insurance”
is likely, not remote. In fact, since individuals are entitled to collect Social
Security even if they continue to work, only an early death (without survivor
beneficiaries) prevents ultimate receipt of payments. Thus, the insurance
analogy is upside down—those who win (by living until old age) collect the
most in Social Security benefits, whereas real insurance compensates the
policyholders with the biggest real-life losses.
Social Security does not operate like real insurance because it is not
concerned with compensating for losses at all.229 If it were actually insuring
against the risk of poverty in old age, it would matter whether a person
would be poor without the benefits. In contrast, Social Security is an entitle-
ment earned by all premium payers; there is no risk pooling. Social Secur-
ity’s most essential feature is its entitlement character, and means testing
benefits would fundamentally change its nature. The architects of Social Se-
225 See STEUERLE & QUAKENBUSH, supra note 125. R
226 The insured individual does not collect life insurance proceeds—the policy’s benefi-
ciaries do after the policyholder’s death. Holders of term life insurance rationally cease cover-
age when they no longer have financially dependent family members to be beneficiaries.
227 See BD. OF TR. FED. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. TRUST
FUNDS, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2013), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/tr/2013/
tr2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0Bcwc7fcEeK [hereinafter 2013 FEDERAL OLD-AGE
ANNUAL REPORT].
228 See CARRIE WERNER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, C2010BR-09, THE OLDER POPULATION:
2010, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-09.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/0choFRB55Mi. Some Social Security recipient are under 65, including chil-
dren, widows, and individuals who began collecting before age 65.
229 But see MICHAEL GRAETZ & JERRY MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY 94–99 (1999) (stating
that there are uncertainties about retirement security, so retirement should be an insurable
event).
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curity deliberately chose not to means test, and the demise of traditional
welfare230 proves that their concerns were prescient. Nonetheless, because it
is not means tested, it does not directly respond to the risk of poverty in old
age, and consequently fails to resemble insurance. While it does prevent
many older individuals from falling into poverty, its non-targeted design is
at odds with an insurance-against-loss model.
C. Payroll Taxes Are Not Like Private Savings
Another paradigm that people use for understanding the payroll tax and
its relationship to retirement benefits is the private savings model, also
called the “bank account” understanding.231 This analogy is flawed also. In a
private retirement trust, individuals contribute funds that are invested or
safeguarded by a trustee until the beneficiaries are eligible to withdraw the
funds. The amount withdrawn during retirement depends on the amounts
contributed and the rate of return earned while saved. Because Social Secur-
ity payments are made on a pay as you go basis, an individual’s contribution
to the system is not invested to be returned later; it is immediately paid out
to current beneficiaries. Even the trust fund amounts are unlike a real sav-
ings plan because there is no connection between investment returns in the
trust fund and the payments received by retirees. Instead, benefits to retirees
are determined based on a statutory formula. Some individuals will receive
more—and others less—than their contributions in payroll taxes. Early par-
ticipants in the program received significantly more in retirement benefits
than they had paid in taxes,232 and many individuals retiring today paid more
in taxes than they will receive in benefits.233 Beneficiaries cannot be de-
prived of their formulary benefits because of poor investment returns on
payroll taxes contributed.
President George W. Bush made privatization of Social Security one of
his major initiatives,234 and it was controversial precisely because it would
have radically transformed Social Security into something that it was not.
The changes that would have been required to convert the current system
into one of private accounts illustrate just how different the current system is
from actual private accounts.235 Thus, it is clear that the system does not
230 Aid to Families with Dependent Children, what had been traditional welfare, was abol-
ished as part of the Personal Responsibility And Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
231 See Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 229, at 259. R
232 See generally Smith et al., supra note 126. R
233 See STEUERLE & QUAKENBUSH, supra note 125. R
234 See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Renews Push to Partly Privatize Social Security, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2002, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/01/us/bush-re-
news-push-to-partly-privatize-social-security.html, archived at http://perma.cc/0EhVxGaRy
Gs.
235 See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. SEC., supra note 20; Laurence Seid- R
man, Social Security: What Now?, 106 TAX NOTES 463, 468 (2005).
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resemble a private savings strategy. While every taxed dollar of earnings
produces a return benefit in the form of retirement payments, the redistribu-
tive benefit formula fails to resemble a market-based return.236 The system
overall is a poor imitation of real private savings.
D. General Revenues Already Fund Entitlements
A final mistake that people make about Social Security is connected to
the other three. People believe that the money for retirement benefits is com-
pletely separate from the rest of the federal budget. This belief is not surpris-
ing, given that the law restricts paying Social Security benefits from sources
other than dedicated tax collections and trust fund accumulations, and pay-
roll taxes must be dedicated to this purpose.237 Nevertheless, investing the
trust funds in government securities co-mingles the trust funds with other
government money.238 When the trust fund buys Treasury securities, it lends
payroll tax revenue within the government, making payroll taxes collected
available for other government uses.
The investment requirement means that general revenues already fi-
nance entitlements, and the system was designed so that they would. Repay-
ments to the trust fund on redemption of the Treasury securities that it holds
must come from somewhere other than payroll taxes. Those funds must
come from wherever the government ordinarily gets funds to repay debt—
either taxes or more borrowing. If income taxes fund debt repayment, then
they will finance Social Security through repayments to the trust fund. So,
the Social Security trust fund is inextricably intermingled with general reve-
nues that the government collects under the income tax.
As Social Security payments rise with the retirement of the baby
boomers, general revenues will increasingly finance benefit payments be-
cause the trust fund will be drawing down on its investment in government
bonds. The Social Security system will be taking cash from general reve-
nues. So, the long-term prospect for Social Security is that substantial gen-
eral revenues will be used to finance benefits to recipients, even though,
under current law, the funds travel through a convoluted system to get there.
When the trust funds run out, the elaborate rationale for paying benefits from
general revenue disappears, and we will need to directly decide whether to
finance retirement security with general revenue.
236 Low earners die younger than high earners, but the formula does not attempt to neutral-
ize that fact. See JOYCE MANCHESTER & JULIE TOPOLESKI, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, GROWING
DISPARITIES IN LIFE EXPECTANCY (2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/ftpdocs/91xx/doc9104/04-17-lifeexpectancy_brief.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0P
gPe6PfRuT.
237 See BD. OF TR. FED. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. TRUST
FUNDS, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2012), available at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2012/tr2012.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0QDVnFnCrBP.
238 See supra Part III.A.
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The commingling of dedicated taxes and general revenues already ex-
ists for Medicare, our other major entitlement program. We are already fur-
ther along in facing the problems of financing Medicare, since payroll taxes
have already failed to keep up with the costs of the system. Nevertheless,
Medicare has been more opaque because the connection between payments
into the system and benefits out is not as explicit as it is for Social Security.
Despite alarmists worried about Social Security, the cost of Medicare—and
health care more generally—is the number one financial challenge we face
as a nation. In 2012, 23% of federal spending was for health care, dwarfing
other priorities like education at 3% and exceeding defense only slightly, at
25%.239
What have we done about Medicare in light of the inadequacy of dedi-
cated payroll tax revenues? We have taken the money from elsewhere in the
budget. In its latest report, the Medicare trustees said: “This year’s report
projects the difference between outlays and dedicated financing revenues to
exceed 45 percent of total Medicare outlays during fiscal year 2012, prompt-
ing a determination of ‘excess general revenue Medicare funding’ for the
seventh consecutive report, triggering another ‘Medicare funding warn-
ing.’” 240 General revenues covered the Medicare shortfalls identified by the
trustees, and entitlements were spared the automatic cuts of this year’s auto-
matic sequester.241 We are not covering the costs of Medicare with payroll
taxes, even though those taxes—unlike the Social Security portion—are not
subject to an earnings cap, and even though the Affordable Care Act insti-
tuted additional taxes on high-income earners with both labor income and
investment income dedicated to healthcare costs.242
General revenues pay for the majority of federal health-care expendi-
tures, which means that income taxes are financing the health care that all
older Americans receive. President Obama recently lamented that older
Americans have the mistaken view that they pay in full for their Medicare
benefits.243 People think their contributions cover their expenses because the
239 See Federal Budget, USGOVERNMENTSPENDING.COM, http://www.usgovernmentspend-
ing.com/health_care_budget_2012_1.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2013), archived at http://
perma.cc/0hq8X2PymGr.
240 Soc. Sec. & Medicare Bds. Trs., A Summary of the 2013 Annual Reports, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/oact/trsum/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2013), archived at http://perma.
cc/0M5q7cQzYdy.
241 BD. OF TRS., FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TRUST FUNDS, THE
2012 ANNUAL REPORT (2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2012.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/0mUwJ1fku8k (showing general revenues covered shortfalls); see generally
KAREN SPAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42050, BUDGET SEQUESTRATION AND SELECTED PRO-
GRAM EXEMPTIONS AND SPECIAL RULES (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R42050.pdf (detailing programs exempt from sequestration, including Medicare and Social
Security), archived at http://perma.cc/03pRVVY8RW1.
242 See I.R.C. § 1411 (Supp. V 2011) (3.8% Net Investment Income Tax); I.R.C.
§ 3101(b)(2) (Supp. V 2011) (0.9% additional Medicare tax on high earners).
243 See Jackie Calmes, Public Misperceptions of Government Benefits Makes Trimming
Them Harder, N.Y. TIMES Apr. 3, 2013, at A0, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/
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payroll tax and Medicare premium system lead them to believe that.244 The
general public is woefully misinformed about the economics of government-
financed health care and who benefits most from it.245 They are wrong, but
their mistake is precisely what the policy seems to have intended. While
Social Security is not there yet, Medicare is an example of what funding
entitlements in the future may demand from general tax revenues. The Social
Security trustees have called on Congress to address the projected shortfalls
over the long term,246 but it has yet to do so. Because the insolvency of the
Social Security trust fund is still a long way in the future, it is impossible to
know how the government will ultimately address it. While raising payroll
taxes and cutting benefits are possible solutions,247 the Medicare model of
using non-dedicated revenues is an important forerunner that sheds light on
how lawmakers can finesse the challenges.
E. Mythology Hasn’t Protected Social Security Benefits From Reform
The myths that payroll taxes are insurance premiums, private savings,
and confined in a lockbox have protected the most regressive tax from chal-
lenge. If payroll taxes really were insurance premiums, then they could be a
fair price for reducing individual risks; if they really were private savings
then we would each be creating personal property interests with our pay-
ments; if they were in a lockbox then we might be confident that taxpayers
would get the value of what they contributed. Each of these myths contrib-
utes to acceptance of heavy tax burdens by workers because they create the
impression that the system’s design is integral to an entitlement to retirement
security—something everyone wants.248 The rhetoric is powerful in connect-
ing payroll taxes and desirable public spending. But these myths are analyti-
cal constructs that narrowly frame conventional analysis about retirement
security. All the options being considered by policymakers for reforming
04/us/politics/misperception-of-government-benefits-makes-trimming-them-harder.html?_r=
1&, archived at http://perma.cc/0v1ehZ5nsP4.
244 Id. (“[T]he president was referring to the widespread and incorrect view, especially
among older Americans, that Medicare recipients get only what they have paid for through
taxes, premiums and medical co-payments.”).
245 Children constitute 49% of Medicaid beneficiaries, and the blind and disabled com-
prise 14%, but account for 43% of the total budget. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 2012 109 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/com-
pendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0151.pdf (showing numbers of beneficiaries; percentages of total
calculated), archived at http://perma.cc/08kZ6MEXKCk.
246 2013 FEDERAL OLD-AGE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 227, at 5. R
247 See generally SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 124 (considering multiple R
options for raising taxes and modifying benefits).
248 Even the Tea Party likes Social Security and Medicare. See Theda Skocpol & Vanessa
Williamson, Whose Tea Party Is It?. N.Y TIMES CAMPAIGN STOPS (Dec. 26, 2011, 9:00 PM),
http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/26/whose-tea-party-is-it/, archived at http://
perma.cc/0qPcd9WxC28/.
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Social Security and its financing are limited by these heuristics.249 It is very
difficult to think outside the payroll tax/retirement benefits box with these
dominant references.
Despite the mythology, Social Security benefits have not in fact been
immune to reform and diminution over time. Taxes on Social Security bene-
fits have risen over time,250 as have payroll tax rates. In 1983, Congress
altered essential elements of the program to extend its long-term solvency.
For example, current workers must delay retirement, even though many of
them paid taxes prior to the adoption of the rules increasing the retirement
age. People born in 1960 or later will not reach full retirement age until 67,
compared to 65 for their parents.251 The major deficit reduction proposals on
the table today include substantial entitlement reform as a central feature,252
despite the fact that the Social Security system is not in imminent financial
distress.253 The trustees project that the Social Security trust fund will be
solvent through 2035254 and that payroll tax revenues will fund 75% of bene-
fits through 2087.255 Nevertheless, the President’s latest budget includes a
subtle diminution in Social Security benefits. It proposes changing the cost-
of-living formula applicable to increases that retirees will receive in their
benefits over time to the “chained consumer price index.”256 The most eld-
erly—who are also the neediest recipients of Social Security—would lose
the most under the proposed change.257 Given that the greatest fiscal pressure
249 See generally SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 124 (the CBO’s compre- R
hensive analysis of Social Security policy options).
250 Social Security recipients are taxed, under the income tax system, to the extent that the
combination of their modified adjusted gross income and one-half of their benefits exceed the
statutory base, $25,000 for individuals and $32,000 for married individuals filing jointly. Once
the combined total of the modified adjusted gross income and one-half Social Security benefits
exceeds $34,000 for individuals, or $44,000 for married individuals filing jointly, eighty-five
percent of the benefits are included in gross income. See I.R.C. § 86 (2006).
251 SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 124, at 9. R
252 See generally NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, THE MOMENT
OF TRUTH (2010), available at http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/
files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0Qh8XUJiy6
N; BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., RESTORING AMERICA’S FUTURE (2010), available at http://bipar-
tisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/BPC%20FINAL%20REPORT%20FOR%20PRINTER%
2002%2028%2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0NRNkBq17Hg.
253 In isolation, the Social Security system’s future looks surprisingly robust, with
much of the current concern about its future based on unnecessarily pessimistic eco-
nomic assumptions and a widespread failure to understand that future changes in the
proportion of retirees to workers will be more than offset by future increases in
worker productivity.
Buchanan, supra note 221, at 261. R
254 2013 FEDERAL OLD-AGE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 227, at 3. R
255 See Soc. Sec. & Medicare Bds. Trs., supra note 240. R
256 SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 124, at 5 (“Scheduled benefits are in- R
dexed to growth in earnings and (after initial benefits are received) to inflation”). The chained
CPI would produce smaller increases over time than does the formula currently used, reducing
the total benefits that retirees receive over a lifetime.
257 See Tara Siegel Bernard, Budget Negotiating Chip Has Big Downside for Old and
Poor, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 2013, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/20/
your-money/the-potential-effect-of-obamas-social-security-proposal.html, archived at http://
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comes from rising medical costs, not retirement expenditures, some believe
that reducing retirement security now may be unnecessarily painful.258
Thus, the payroll tax-Social Security link, and the mythology that has
developed around it, has not prevented entitlement modifications. There are
no private accounts, lockboxes or insurance contracts. Social Security is a
government program subject to the political process, and vulnerable to fiscal
pressures. Entitlements are sensitive to economic times and public priorities,
and there is nothing intrinsically wrong with that. But just as the terms of
Social Security retirement benefits may need to change, financing retirement
security also must adjust to maintain fair burdens in every generation.
IV. FUND RETIREMENT SECURITY WITH GENERAL REVENUES
A. Raising the Earnings Cap Is Not a Good Solution
The long-term Social Security projections259 are a legitimate concern,
but they are not an emergency; in twenty-two years, payments will be
twenty-two cents short on the dollar if Congress does nothing between now
and then to address the issue.260 When the trust fund expires, the system does
not suddenly go belly up. Rather, the pool of money available to pay retirees
will be limited to the payroll taxes currently collected (plus the small amount
of income tax imposed on Social Security retiree benefits). Although it is not
clear how benefits would be cut, current law requires that they will have to
be reduced at that time.261
The government is aware of this problem, and has been considering a
broad array of options to prevent a plunge in benefits.262 Rebalancing Social
Security with payroll tax collections can be achieved by tweaking either the
taxing or spending side, or both. Some of the proposals being considered
have been on the spending side—reducing benefits paid out or starting them
later. Others have been on the taxing side—increasing payroll taxes to re-
plenish the trust fund. In 2010, the Congressional Budget Office did a com-
perma.cc/09wSAEgvDTC. The proposal is particularly controversial because some argue that
the chained CPI is a less accurate measure of the cost of living for older people than it is for
younger people.
258 Robert Reich, What’s the ‘Chained CPI,’ Why It’s Bad for Social Security and Why the
White House Shouldn’t Be Touting It, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 4, 2013 2:39 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/chained-cpi_b_3016471.html (citing MoveOn.org, Robert
Reich on Chained CPI (the proposal to cut Social Security benefits), YOUTUBE (Apr. 3, 2013),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fvXuANd2l80#t=98), archived at http://perma.cc/0gjntE
DYd4v.
259 2013 FEDERAL OLD-AGE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 227, at 3. R
260 Id.
261 Social Security Act § 201(h), Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 401(h) (2006)); Section 201(h) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 401(h) (2006).
262 See generally SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 124 (comprehensive R
study of proposals made by different analysts and policymakers).
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prehensive study that included thirty options for reform of Social Security
and its financing.263 It considered changing the taxation of earnings in nine
different ways, and altering the benefits formulas or timing in twenty-one
ways. The thirty options have vastly different budgetary effects and distribu-
tional consequences, and only some of them would solve the long-term fis-
cal imbalance in the system.264 There are many possible changes on the tax
side, the simplest of which is raising the rates, as has been done twenty-one
times since the payroll tax was first adopted in 1937.265
The possibility of raising or eliminating the earnings cap has been the
most widely discussed solution for the long-term imbalance.266 Under current
law, wage earnings up to $113,700 are taxed for OASDI, but amounts above
that are exempt. The cap works like a cliff; workers pay the full rate until
they hit the limit, and then nothing.267 The CBO considered a variety of
methods for increasing the cap.268 Removing the cap altogether would raise
the most total revenue, compared to the other options for changing the taxa-
tion of earnings.269
Although removing the cap and taxing all wages would ameliorate the
regressivity problem, it would exacerbate the other problem that this article
has highlighted. It would increase the tax on labor income, further skewing
the unequal treatment of labor income and capital income. High-income
wage earners would pay more tax than they do under current law, and at an
even higher marginal rate than they do now. Top wage earners would con-
tinue to pay income tax at a marginal rate of 39.6%, but they would pay
additional payroll taxes at 15.3%,270 which they do not pay on their last dol-
lars under current law. Along with the extra 0.9% “additional Medicare tax”
on high earners,271 top wage-earners would have a total federal marginal rate
263 The Senate Finance Committee recently collected proposals. See generally S. FIN.
COMM. STAFF, 113TH CONG., NON-INCOME TAX ISSUES AND RELATED REFORMS (2013), avail-
able at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06202013%20Non-Income%20Tax%20
Reform%20Options%20Paper1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0ywGMsjY6CK.
264 See generally SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 124, at xi fig.1. R
265 See Social Security and Medicare Tax Rates, supra note 26. R
266 See Thomas Edsall, The War on Entitlements, N.Y. Times OPINIONATOR (Mar. 6, 2013,
11:40 PM), http://www.opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/06/the-war-on-entitlements/?_
r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/0n59t5Pu4X6; SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS, supra note
124, at 18–19. R
267 See generally supra note 36 and accompanying text. R
268 Proposals suggested raising the cap some, removing it altogether, taxing above the cap
at a reduced rate or at steps, and allowing the cap to move as a percentage of total earnings in
the economy SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 124, at xi, 16–19. R
269 Id. at xi summary fig.1.
270 Employees technically pay only half the payroll tax, while their employers pay the
other half, but economists agree that the entire economic burden of the tax—both parts—falls
on employees. See HUNGERFORD, supra note 5, at 1 n.4 (“Most economists agree that workers R
ultimately bear the full burden of the payroll tax. Employers typically pass on their share of the
payroll tax to employees through paying lower wages.”)
271 I.R.C § 3101(b)(2) (Supp. V 2011), added by the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 9015, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
and Notice of Public Hearing Rules Relating to Additional Medicare Tax, 77 Fed. Reg. 72268
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of 55.8%. Their investment-earning counterparts would pay at a maximum
rate of 23.8%, including the 20% preferential rate on capital gains272 and the
net investment income tax under the Affordable Care Act.273
Many proponents of progressivity favor lifting or removing the payroll
tax cap. But improving progressivity in that way has its equity costs: increas-
ing vertical equity by increasing taxes on high-income wage earners must be
balanced against creating more horizontal inequity between equal earning
wage earners and holders of capital.274 It is not obvious how proponents of a
progressive tax system should balance those competing interests, but I am
reticent to impose greater taxes on wage earners in the name of fairness
before increasing taxes on holders of wealth.
B. Social Security Should Be Funded by Fair Taxes
Even though the CBO’s thirty options appear to offer a broad range of
choices, they are actually quite limited in imagination. Each of the consid-
ered options conceptualizes the Social Security/payroll tax scheme as a
closed universe in which all the moving parts are contained.275 But, in fact,
there is no compelling reason to look for solutions to the problem of long-
term Social Security insolvency only in the payroll tax system and schedule
of retirement benefits. Social Security’s outlays constitute one-fifth of total
federal spending,276 more than any other single budget function, including
defense.277 That makes retirement security one of the principal functions of
the federal government. Yet, it is not funded by the broad-based income tax
that was adopted for the purpose of financing federal purposes in the most
equitable way. If Congress opened up the possibility of using general reve-
nues, in addition to the payroll tax, the financial options for saving Social
Security would expand.278
(proposed Dec. 5, 2012). See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Public Hearing
Rules Relating to Additional Medicare Tax, 77 Fed. Reg. 72268 (proposed Dec. 5, 2012).
272 I.R.C. § 1(h) (West 2013).
273 I.R.C. § 1411 (Supp. V 2011). The 3.8% Net Investment Income Tax is imposed on
investment income of high-income taxpayers. It was adopted in § 1402(a)(1) of the Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111–152, 124 Stat. 1029, and goes
into effect for 2013.
274 “Taxes on labor income alone—even if, unlike FICA taxes, they were progressively
structured—do not produce taxation based upon ability to pay, for those with the greatest
ability to pay often have channeled their monies into capital.” Graetz, supra note 9, at 864. R
275 SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 124, at x (“Other than an increase in the R
Social Security payroll tax, changes to federal tax policy are not considered.”).
276 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2012 LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY:
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 1 (2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/attachments/43648-SocialSecurity.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/0oH2mNYHKVd.
277 Social security accounts for 22% of federal outlays and defense for 19%. OMB, 2012
numbers at 348–49, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/
fy2012/assets/hist.pdf.
278 It could also open a Pandora’s Box.
[O]nce Social Security’s fiscal elements are viewed simply as part of the aggregate
fiscal mix, questions arise as to whether we should replace payroll taxes with wealth
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While President Roosevelt may have been right in thinking that a dedi-
cated “contribution” based on payroll was crucial for funding retirement
security at the program’s inception,279 today there is no compelling reason to
eschew funding retirement security with income taxes or wealth taxes.280 A
major reason why the Social Security system is underfunded today is be-
cause income has shifted to capital from labor; if workers were receiving a
higher share of corporate productivity, their wages—and their payroll
taxes—would be higher.281 Today’s payroll tax includes only 84% of total
wages in the economy, compared to 90% in 1983.282 That decline is the re-
sult of diverging earnings of the top earners, compared to everyone else.283
The changing distribution of income from labor to capital, and from rank-
and-file to highly paid workers, must be considered in determining whether
a once-reasonable system of financing particular benefits has become in-
creasingly unfair over time. The government’s responsibilities in taxing and
spending depend, in part, on the pre-tax distribution of income, wealth, and
power. The more unequal background institutions are, the more work a just
government must do to guarantee equality.284
There may be a mistake of cognitive connection in this story. Because
retirement security is financed by taxing work, it appears that there is a natu-
ral connection between the two parts of the program. But just because retire-
ment payments make it possible for people to stop working does not mean
that those payments must be financed by work. We do not tax privately
owned weapons to pay for national defense, even though national defense
or inheritance taxes, or vice versa. The benefit of the current arrangement is that it
takes some choices off the table and constrains other choices in ways that might
make policymaking more understandable.
See Buchanan, supra note 221, at 276. R
279 In a 1934 address to Congress, FDR insisted that Social Security “must be financed by
contributions, not taxes.” Address to Advisory Council of the Committee on Economic Secur-
ity on the Problems of Economic and Social Security, 3 PUB. PAPERS 452–55 (November 14th
1934), available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/fdrstmts.html.
280 See Jonathan Barry Forman, Making Social Security Work, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 160
(2004) (“it would make more sense to use the income tax or, perhaps, a wealth tax, to pay for
any redistribution through Social Security benefits”).
281 Josh Bivens, More Fiscal Implications of a Rising Capital Share of Income, ECON.
POL’Y INST. BLOG (Jan. 2, 2013, 2:36 PM) http://www.epi.org/blog/fiscal-implications-rising-
capital-share-income/ (estimating that the shift has cost the Social Security trust fund $365
billion by 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/0zn8gUEbJJs.
282 At the time of the 1983 reforms, the “cap” on annual earnings that were taxed
was set to capture 90 percent of all economy-wide earnings, and to rise with the rate
of average wage growth. But since wage-growth above the cap was so much faster
than the average in subsequent decades, more and more of overall earnings are spill-
ing over the cap.
Id.
283 See SAEZ, supra note 19, at tbl.1. R
284 Rawls was not particular about taxation because he considered various taxes to be
consistent with justice. He suggested that a wealth tax or an income tax could be adopted for
the purpose of preventing “accumulations of wealth that are judged to be inimical to back-
ground justice, for example, to the fair value of the political liberties and to fair equality of
opportunity.” JOHN RAWLS, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 161 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
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makes it possible for people to forego defending themselves. We do not tax
cars to pay for public transportation, even though buses and trains make it
possible for people to stop driving cars. The connection between wages and
retirement payments is invented by the current design of the system, with no
inherent compelling logic underlying it.
Many public goods that bestow private benefits are financed with gen-
eral revenues, and retirement security should be funded the same way. Com-
pare retirement security and K-12 education. Education is a public good—it
benefits the society as a whole by improving the productivity of the popula-
tion, while inculcating civic responsibility and engagement. But it is also a
private good because it increases lifetime incomes for educated individuals,
and contributes to personal development.285 Similarly, retirement security
prevents the elderly population from becoming dependent on others, protects
small communities from burdens of support, and allows an orderly exit from
the labor market to the benefit of both young and old, while also providing
individual benefits to retirees themselves.286 We pay for public education
with a variety of taxes, and people who pay higher taxes in whatever form
finance more education than those who pay lower taxes. Like retirement
security, nobody pays for their own K-12 education with their own taxes—
one generation supports another. Redistribution occurs across incomes, geo-
graphic areas, and ethnic groups. While the method for financing education
is often politically controversial, the national commitment to free public edu-
cation is not threatened. We can disagree about who pays the taxes even
while remaining committed to what they finance.
That commitment is an important prototype for retirement security. Re-
tirement security flips the generations, but otherwise looks much like spend-
ing on public education. Like education, the system is redistributive in
multiple directions.287 It is also similarly entrenched—we have a social com-
mitment to retirement security benefits. Social Security is popular, and for
good reason.288 It is a great program—an undeniable triumph of govern-
285 More education produces higher earnings. See Employment by Summary Education
and Training Assignment, 2010 and projected 2020, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.
gov/emp/ep_table_education_summary.htm (last updated Feb. 1, 2012), archived at http://
perma.cc/06LztyAuW9D.
286 See generally Patricia E. Dilley, Remarks: Reinventing Retirement: Reforming Social
Security, Medicare and Private Pension Plans: Proceedings of the 2006 Annual Meeting, As-
sociation of American Law Schools, Section on Employee Benefits, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 695 (2006).
287 More Americans are transitioning from net winners to net losers in the system overall.
See STEUERLE & QUAKENBUSH, supra note 125. R
288 The reasons for this popularity are not entirely determinable. Burke and McCouch ar-
gued that “[t]he presence of large positive transfers to virtually all income groups helps to
explain why social security has traditionally enjoyed such widespread political support.”
Burke & McCouch, supra note 113, at 1217. Martin Feldstein has argued that the system’s R
popularity will decline as its costs and inefficiencies become clearer. See Feldstein, supra note
220, at 27–28. R
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ment.289 It has been crucial in supporting quality of life for millions of eld-
erly Americans, and has eased the social transformation of the family over
the last century.290 The working generation, collectively, supports its parents,
as a replacement for individual workers supporting their own aging parents.
We do not need the social insurance fiction or a dedicated payroll tax to
justify income support for the elderly.291 While the social insurance fiction
may have helped to entrench Social Security in its early years, retirement
security is too popular and too successful to be vulnerable to extinction to-
day.292 Public support for those no longer able to work is a reasonable way to
resolve one of the central questions facing contemporary societies: how to
allocate the benefits and burdens of social productivity over time.293 National
priorities do not automatically become vulnerable without a dedicated reve-
nue stream connected to them. People are concerned about the date of the
trust fund’s insolvency because they do not want the system to cease. And it
should not. But the significance of the trust fund’s insolvency is a problem
that politics—not economics—has created. Retirement security is a reasona-
ble government entitlement; a rich society can guarantee an old age without
poverty to people who have fulfilled their obligations of citizenship.294 It is
time to accept the permanence of Social Security so we can have a more
productive debate about it.
C. Separating Payroll Taxes from Retirement Benefits Might Allow
Desirable Modification to Both
Just because people like Social Security does not mean that the program
is perfect in every way. The fiction that has justified taxing wage earners so
heavily has also largely frozen the program’s design. If we move away from
289 “Social security’s success in bolstering the economic position of the elderly, particu-
larly the elderly poor, makes relative political security its just desert.” THEODORE MARMOR,
JERRY MASHAW & PHILIP HARVEY, AMERICA’S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE xv (1992).
290 “Starting right after World War II, the extended family household fell out of favor with
the American public. In 1940, about a quarter of the population lived in one; by 1980, just 12%
did.” But it has been on the rise in recent years, and in 2008, 16.1% of the population lived in
extended family households. See The Return of the Multi-Generational Family Household,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/03/18/the-return-
of-the-multi-generational-family-household/, archived at http://perma.cc/09FtPTa38pK.
291 One commentator has predicted that “[t]he political power of the elderly and elderly
lobbies like the AARP make it unlikely that future Social Security retirement benefits will
actually ever be cut by much.” Forman, supra note 280, at 173. R
292 “[P]olitical untouchability has led pundits to label Social Security ‘the third rail of
American politics’ and critics to lament the inability of politicians to make tough choices and
dramatically revise the program’s benefits and financing.” Dilley, supra note 112, at 1052. R
293 See Sugin, Philosophical Objection, supra note 105, at 243 (discussing John Rawls, R
Social Unity and Primary Goods, in Collected Papers 359, 365 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999)).
294 Patricia Dilley has argued that Social Security creates economic rights on account of
effort, rather than investment. Dilley, supra note 112, at 984 (“Social Security, far from being R
a quaint, retrograde souvenir of the New Deal, in fact was ahead of its time in creating eco-
nomic rights based on effort rather than equity in support of the public institution of broad-
based retirement.”)
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the notion that people have paid for something precisely along the lines of
what we have, there would be more freedom to modify the program and
improve its equity and efficiency, while maintaining its essential feature as
an entitlement. Shifting public focus away from the contrived crisis arising
from the depletion of the trust fund would allow more energy to be invested
in better achieving the goals of protecting the elderly from poverty and mak-
ing retirement a civic right.
For example, retirement security could be transformed from a right to a
social minimum. Public guarantee of a basic minimum has played an impor-
tant role in contemporary political theory295 because it allows individuals to
exercise their political rights and civic obligations. Unknown to most people,
Social Security has included “minimum” retirement payments for individu-
als who worked at very low wages during their lifetime.296 Very few people
are currently eligible for the minimum payment because they would be enti-
tled to more under the regular benefits formula.297 But the minimum payment
is an important paradigm for what publicly funded retirement security might
be if it were freed from the mythologies that lead people to believe a closer
connection between payroll taxes and retirement benefits than actually ex-
ists. The minimum benefit in the current system provides subsistence to indi-
viduals who earned very little while they worked, but worked for many
years.298 Social Security as a guaranteed basic minimum reflects a commit-
ment to public financing of retirement dignity, in exchange for an individ-
ual’s satisfaction of a civic obligation to work for an extended period.299
The obligation to work differs from the obligation to pay taxes. Under
this approach, Social Security is better understood as an entitlement for pro-
ductivity during a lifetime, rather than a benefit purchased with prior
295 See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 104 at 45 (“[A] social minimum as a positive right R
. . . identifies a basic core of purely personal property rights that are essential for individual
liberty . . . .”).
296 See Kelly A. Olsen & Don Hoffmeyer, Social Security’s Special Minimum Benefit, 64
Soc. Sec. Bull. 1, 5 (2001–02) (“Since the special minimum benefit was intended to provide
regular long-term workers with an income that would free them from dependency on welfare,
one might conclude that it was designed to reduce poverty. That rationale also might explain
why the maximum special minimum benefit payable . . . at the program’s inception nearly
equaled the poverty threshold (96 percent) for aged individuals.”)
297 This is because of the design for eligibility for the special minimum benefit. Id. at 1.
That benefit could be made more generous. Eugene Steuerle has proposed adopting a more
substantial minimum benefit. See Steuerle Statement, supra note 129, at 8. R
298 Individuals must work for at least ten years to be eligible for the special minimum
benefit, but low wages will not reduce it. See SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS, supra note
124, at 9. R
299 The goal of providing a basic income level to poor workers after their retirement
is simply no justification for mandatory social security provisions that require poor
workers to shift consumption from the present to the future. At a minimum, poor
workers should be exempted from paying social security taxes after they have partic-
ipated in the payroll tax system for a sufficient number of quarters to qualify for
payment of minimum benefits.
Graetz, supra note 9, at 868. See also Dilley, supra note 112. R
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taxes.300 This conceptualization acknowledges the collective payment of one
generation to the one that preceded it, as a debt for past service, instead of
pretending that Social Security is something we each pay for in advance.
The principle of entitlement earned for productivity also allows more imagi-
nation in the definition of who becomes entitled. If retirement security is
understood as an entitlement for working, the amount of benefits might vary
along multiple axes—by years worked, types of jobs worked, or other fac-
tors related to the grounds for entitlement or need for security. For example,
while productive—but unpaid—work fails to earn credit for Social Security
under current law, a civic obligation framework could include services in the
home.301 The prior generation’s productivity contributed to our own, and to-
day’s earners should be willing to pay for those contributions in the same
way that they pay for the rest of the public infrastructure that allows them to
prosper.
Retirement policy should account for changes in the lives of workers
and the structure of the work force and income base over the last century:
the expected income and demographics of today’s retirees differ substan-
tially from those in the early years of the program. Many more women work,
so there are fewer single-earner couples, but more families headed by a sin-
gle adult.302 Never-married retirees are more likely to be poor than those who
have been married.303 Median family income and income inequality have
both risen.304 Many people can work at older ages, at jobs that require less
physical exertion. The Social Security Administration projects that future
retirees will have more income (i.e. less poverty) than earlier generations,
but that their retirement income will decline as a percentage of their working
income.305 Most importantly, projections show that the retirement income
prospects are dimmest for identifiable groups “including unmarried retirees,
non-Hispanic blacks, high school dropouts, those with weak labor force at-
tachments, and those with the lowest lifetime earnings.”306 A more effective
Social Security system might legitimately address these challenges.
300 “Notwithstanding the centrality of the right to private property in American democ-
racy, a tradition of rights based on labor and earning also has deep cultural roots and provides
an alternative democratic tradition that can serve as the basis for an earnings-based entitlement
that encompasses redistribution without contradiction.” See also Dilley, supra note 112, at R
1044.
301 See generally Nancy Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L. REV. 1571 (1996) (propos-
ing taxing housework so that homemakers could earn credits towards Social Security); Sugin,
Philosophical Objection, supra note 105 (distinguishing productivity from market work and R
leisure); Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and
Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet’s Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264 (1989).
302 Barbara A. Butrica, Karen E. Smith & Howard M. Iams, This Is Not Your Parents’
Retirement: Comparing Retirement Income Across Generations, 72 Soc. Sec. Bull. 37, 37
(2012).
303 See id. at 40.
304 See id. at 37, 41, 44.
305 See id. at 38.
306 Id. at 55.
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V. CONCLUSION
“Entitlements” has become a dirty word, as the costs of health care
threaten our country’s long-term fiscal well-being.307 Substantial cutbacks in
benefits were precisely what President Roosevelt intended to foreclose when
he draped Social Security in the insurance cloak,308 but the fortress he had
hoped to create is developing cracks. The main theme of this article is that
the mythology of social insurance and personal savings has given entitle-
ment programs a veneer of protection, and has made people complacent
about paying payroll taxes to fund them.309 But it has not actually protected
the programs from reform or prevented general revenues from supplement-
ing dedicated taxes.310 Instead, it has contributed to a tax system in which
labor is substantially overtaxed compared to capital. The system does not
work as an earmark of taxes for spending,311 but it is convenient for collect-
ing large sums cheaply. We pretend that our dedicated taxes neatly finance
particular purposes, and then we can avoid analyzing both the fairness of the
tax and whether the costs could produce greater benefits. On closer analysis,
the arguments for taxing labor income as heavily as we do are wanting. We
should reduce the tax burden on labor compared to capital to promote equal-
ity, autonomy, and individual respect.
Delinking payroll taxes from retirement security—while maintaining a
commitment to retirement security on grounds of justice—only starts the
discussion. This article takes no view on the specific design of retirement
security benefits.312 Instead, it argues that retirement security and its financ-
ing should be determined on grounds of justice, rather than on a contrived
notion of insurance or personal savings. Designing taxes and government
benefits requires an analysis of what individuals owe, and what they deserve
307 See Editorial, The New Republican Landscape: From Congress to Statehouses, A
Sweeping Attempt To Dismantle The Social Compact, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2011, at A22,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/18/opinion/18mon1.html?_r=0, archived at
http://perma.cc/09zMKsB2Upe; Taegan Goddard, Is ‘Entitlement’ A Dirty Word?, THE WEEK
(Apr. 15, 2013, 2:20 PM), http://theweek.com/article/index/242757/is-entitlement-a-dirty-
word, archived at http://perma.cc/0tJeBBLnUzi; Edward Schumacher-Matos, Is ‘Entitlements’
A Dirty Word?, NPR (Aug. 11, 2011, 5:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/ombudsman/2011/
08/11/139557647/is-entitlements-a-dirty-word, archived at http://perma.cc/0MaknohYPPf.
Complaints about entitlements have, in fact, ebbed and flowed for decades. See MARMOR,
MASHAW & HARVEY, supra note 289, at 2. R
308 Roosevelt’s universe of entitlements did not include Medicare and Medicaid, so the
dynamic of entitlement financing and spending is significantly more complex than he may
have imagined. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. 89–97, 79 Stat. 286 created
Medicaid and Medicare in 1965, 30 years after Social Security became law.
309 See Deborah Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. REG.
253 (2011).
310 See supra Part III.E.
311 See supra Part III.C–D.
312 There is a literature on that topic. See, e.g., Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 229, at R
255–78; Steuerle Statement, supra note 129. See SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS, supra R
note 124; BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., supra note 252, at 72–85; NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RE- R
SPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, supra note 252. R
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to receive from—the collective efforts of the community. While it may be
possible to argue for the approximate distribution and amount of benefits
under current law as a combination of desert and need, those rationales
should be explicit in the public conversation.313 Delinking taxes from bene-
fits is both a blessing and a curse. It requires that we articulate a rationale for
whatever schedule of benefits we choose, but it also frees us from the limita-
tions of the analytical frame in which we have been stuck. We need to be
willing to pay for whatever retirement benefits we promise, the same way
that we need to be willing to pay for everything in the federal budget. Retire-
ment security is important enough, successful enough, and venerable enough
that it should be worth paying for with a fair tax.
313 See Buchanan, supra note 221, at 269 (“A PAYGO system does not directly equate R
market returns with ‘just deserts,’ whereas a prefunded system implicitly bases the right to
consume in retirement on abstention from consumption while working.”).
